The Role of Women’s Rights Movements in Reforming Public Policies after the Arab Spring by Zughool, Samar Mohammad Ali
 
 
UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI 





Vloga gibanj za pravice žensk pri spremembah spolno 
diskriminatorne zakonodaje po arabski pomladi 
 
The Role of Women’s Rights Movements in Reforming Public 























UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI 








Mentor: izr. prof. dr. Damjan Lajh  
 
Vloga gibanj za pravice žensk pri spremembah spolno 
diskriminatorne zakonodaje po arabski pomladi 
 
The Role of Women’s Rights Movements in Reforming Public 



















I started this research with the intention to learn and to conclude the ground theory through an 
inductive reasoning. It helped me to explore new theories and to connect it to the empirical 
experiences. One of the main challenges was to stay objective and to combat my own biases. I 
have managed to overcome the challenges and to complete this thesis because of the 
professional supervision and firm support of Prof. Damjan Lajh. I would like to express my 
gratitude to the members of the commission for reviewing and assessing my work. I would like 
also to thank Ms. Anita Žagar for the support and professional technical review.  
I am thankful for the inspiring activists I have met in Jordan and Tunisia. They inspired me to 
continue the research on this topic. I cannot mention all the names, but I would like to esepcially 
thank Ms. Fatma Jegham. In May 2017, I have listened to her speech in Sousse, Tunisia. She 
talked about women’s rights narratives and how it combats extremism through art. We had 
inspirational talks after the plenary discussion. She is a strong leader. She and many other 
amazing women from Jordan and Tunisia have inspired me more than they know. 
In 2014, I was in Jordan. The judge declined me as a witness because I am a woman. The judge 
told me that two women equal one man as a witness. He asked me to bring another woman to 
complete me as one witness, or to ask one man to be a witness on my behalf. I want to dedicate 
this thesis to myself and to each woman who was told she is not good enough because she is a 
woman.  
Finally, I would like to thank my first and most important role model, my mother Maha al 
Syouf, and my supportive father Mohammad al Zughool for the continues support from 
distance. This journey would have been much harder without the support from my parents and 
from my supportive husband, Robert Krizanic. I am also thankful for my supportive sisters and 










The Role of Women’s Rights Movements in Reforming Public Policies after the Arab 
Spring 
 
After the Arab Spring, women’s rights movements in Jordan and in Tunisia are mobilized to 
reform public policies. While the democratization in Tunisia started with the fall of the 
authoritarian regime, the political reform in Jordan was initiated from the top. We used 
inductive reasoning and qualitative research methods to study the role of the movements in 
reforming gender discriminatory policies. In both countries, broader women’s rights narratives 
differ from women’s rights narratives for gender equality. Despite the differences in the 
political context, the movements for gender equality in both countries have encountered similar 
challenges. Islam as a socio-political ideology opposes gender equality at the legislative and 
implementation levels. Without secularization, gender equality in all sectors cannot be 
achieved. WRMs in Tunisia have made progress due to the radical transition led by a secular 
party. State feminism and co-optation of female leadership have meanwhile hindered WRMs 
in Jordan in amending the nationality law. While state feminism in Tunisia has supported the 
movement in the efforts for equal inheritance law, this support has been perceived as selective 
feminism, which prevents the movement from receiving a wider social support for their cause. 
Intersectional feminism is a potential tool for the Tunisian movement to combat selective 
feminism, while the movement in Jordan has been hindered by limitations on mass 
mobilization imposed by the repressive regime. The general frame can be applied for further 
studies in other Arab Muslim countries. 
 
Key words: women’s movements, gender equality, Jordan, Tunisia. 
 
Vloga gibanj za pravice žensk pri spremembah spolno diskriminatorne zakonodaje po 
arabski pomladi 
 
Po arabski pomladi so se gibanja za pravice žensk v Jordaniji in Tuniziji angažirala v 
prizadevanjih za spremembe spolno diskriminatorne zakonodaje. Medtem ko se je 
demokratizacija v Tuniziji začela s padcem avtoritarnega režima, so se reforme v Jordaniji 
začele pri političnem vrhu. Z induktivnim sklepanjem in kvalitativnimi metodami smo preučili 
vlogo gibanj za pravice žensk pri spreminjanju spolno diskriminatorne zakonodaje. Ugotovili 
smo, da se v obeh državah širši diskurz pravic žensk razlikuje od diskurza enakih pravic žensk. 
Kljub razlikam v političnem kontekstu pa so se gibanja za enakost spolov v obeh državah 
soočala s podobnimi izzivi. Islam kot družbeno-politična ideologija onemogoča enakost spolov 
tako na ravni zakonodaje kot njenega izvajanja. Enakosti spolov na vseh področjih ne bo 
mogoče doseči brez sekularizacije. Gibanja za pravice žensk v Tuniziji so dosegla napredek, 
ker je v državi prihajalo do radikalnih sprememb, ki jih je vodila sekularna stranka. Režimski 
feminizem in izkoriščanje ženskih voditeljic v politične namene gibanjem za pravice žensk v 
Jordaniji onemogočata spremembe zakona o državljanstvu. Režimski feminizem v Tuniziji 
podpira gibanje za enakost pri dedovanju. Vendar pa gre pri tej podpori za selektivni 
feminizem, ki gibanju preprečuje, da bi za svoje cilje pridobilo širšo podporo. Intersekcionalni 
feminizem je orodje, s katerim bi se gibanje v Tuniziji lahko borilo proti selektivnemu 
feminizmu. V Jordaniji pa vladajoči režim medtem omejuje mobilizacijo množic. Ta splošni 
okvir se pozneje lahko uporabi za druge raziskave v arabskih muslimanskih državah. 
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1 On the subject and methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction:  
Feminism has emerged along with other social movements demanding political and social 
reforms. In the 19th century, women in France took their first collective action during the 
French revolution (Bessieres and Niedzwiecki, 1991, p. 15). The French revolution was part of 
the first “wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1993, p. 16). In the United States of America, 
the first wave of feminism was officially initiated by the first convention on women’s rights, 
the idea for which was born during the anti-slavery convention, where female activists from 
the movement were not seated due to their gender (The National Portrait Gallery, n.d.). Yet, 
this connection between women’s rights and socio-political liberalization movements might be 
excluded in post-communist countries. A report published by the Committee on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men presented the rise of gender inequalities in most eastern 
and central European countries shortly after the fall of communist regimes (The situation of 
women in the countries of post-communism transition, 2004). 
On one hand, democratization has an impact on public policy making. It makes the process 
more inclusive by distributing the power among different collective actors (Armijo and 
Kearney, 2008). On the other hand, liberalization has its own impact on the democratization 
process. “Liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the half house does not 
stand” (Huntington, 1993, p. 137). Therefore, the role of liberal feminism in reforming policies 
which hinder women from participating equally in public life (Tong, 2009, pp.1–45) is 
expected to get influenced by democratization, as well as influence the democratization 
process. Professor Steven Fish has identified women marginalization as one of the main factors 
for the failure to robust democracy (Fish, 2002, pp. 4–37). 
The report by Human Rights Watch for the year 2017 shows that women in different Arab 
countries are still facing policies which are discriminating against their basic human rights 
(World Report, 2017). The recent Women’s movements in different Arab countries have 
become mobilized to change policies that discriminate against them. (Tarek, 2018; Maktabi, 
2017). The debate is actually still open whether the Arab Spring is a threat or an assist for 
Arabic women (Arshad, 2014; Daoud, 2017; Herzberg, 2013). The uprisings in different Arab 
countries, including the ones that included violence and humanitarian crises, have witnessed 
an increase of women’s participation in the public sphere (Kobaissy, 2017). Therefore, the 
actual question is not regarding the role women played next to their partners during the 
uprisings, but about their success to maintain their rights in the democratic transition and 
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consolidation afterward (Abu Ras et al., 2013). The debates over gender equality in the Arab 
region are mostly channelled through moderate Islamists, conservative Islamists and secularists 
(Fox, Alwazi & Refki, 2016). Some argue that the rise of Islamists is a threat that women could 
end up with even less rights than they had before the Arab Spring (Bayoumy, 2013; Khimish, 
2014), while others claim that Islam is an ideology that supports women’s social and political 
rights (Abu Fares, 2015; Engineer, 2008). 
Jordan and Tunisia are identified as Muslim countries by Constitution (The Constitution of The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1952; Constitution de la République Tunisienne, 2014). On the 
empirical level, Muslim clerics oppose the WSMs seeking gender equality in Tunisia 
(Mosaique FM, 2017). In Jordan, the Islamic Front party has been countering the WSMs that 
have been mobilized to include gender equality in the Jordanian Constitution (Tahboub, 2017, 
2011). However, this is not the only challenge that WSMs are facing. The authorities in Tunisia 
as well as in Jordan have a history of co-opting feminism, while depoliticizing women’s 
movements and not practicing women empowerment on the ground (Al-Atiyat, 2003; C. 
Murphy, 2003). Therefore, legislated policies are not necessary implemented and in practice 
(Makinde, 2005). Thus, this master thesis aims to address the role of WSMs in making gender 
equality policies in Jordan and Tunisia through the different stages of political responsiveness. 
based on the five criteria of policy responsiveness (Schumaker, 1975, pp. 494, 495 
 
1.2 Hypothesis and research questions  
The purpose of this research is to explore the role of Women’s Rights Movements in combating 
the reverse wave after the Arab Spring through the liberalization of public policy making from 
2011 to 2018. With a feminist inductive empirical method, we explore the challenges Women’s 
Rights Movements have been facing during the political liberalization after the Arab Spring. 
We analysed the impact of Islam as a socio-political ideology and the impact of State Feminism 
at different stages of public policy making. We suggest that to achieve gender equality in Jordan 
and Tunisia, Women’s Rights Movements require: 1. The secularization of Constitutions with 
a bottom-up approach; 2. Intersectional feminism on a local level; and 3. Strong cross-Arab 
treaties to combat discrimination against women. 
Consequently, the research questions for this thesis are as following:  
● What is the role of Women’s right movements in reforming public policies on gender 
equality after the Arab Spring in Jordan and Tunisia? 
● What are the main challenges women’s rights movements are facing?  




1.3 Methodology:  
To induct the grounded theory, we apply qualitative research method. The emphasis is on 
secondary resources due to the controversy and currency of the topic. More precisely:  
a) To give a wider view on the intersectionality of the addressed theme, we review the 
literature on women’s movements and their influence at different stages of public policy 
making through political responsiveness in the democratic transition. This is followed 
by the triangulation of data about Arab Spring and women’s rights movements for 
gender equality in Jordan and Tunisia. 
 
b) We analyse qualitative data related to the topic.  
 
c) We use extensive analysis of primary and secondary resources, to identify the 
challenges women’s rights movements in Jordan and Tunisia have been facing. We 
have reviewed primary resources, including the Constitutions of both countries, gender 
discriminatory laws, and Sharia-based laws. We have reviewed primary and secondary 
resources about Sharia laws, and political Islam narratives used in both countries, as 
well as their interaction with Women’s rights Movements. This is followed by an 
analysis of new challenges that have emerged, such as state-feminism and co-optation 
of Women’s Rights Movements.  
 
d) To avoid homogeneity, political ethnography is used as the research strategy to explore 
the narratives for women’s rights and the research questions in each country. We 
analyse documentary films, books and recorded political and socio-political debates on 
the topic.  
 
e) For data triangulation, we conducted further interviews with social actors from various 
backgrounds. The interviewed actors selected for this research comprise members of 
Women’s Rights Movements, neutrals, and the opponents. In Tunisia the interviews 
took place 1. In Monastir and Tunis city during the Euro-Arab youth forum in May 
2018: 2. In Sousse city during the Intercultural Artistic Expression in Fragile Areas 
forum in May 2017; and 3. Through social media channels. Interviews with opponents, 
neutrals and supporters of the selected women’s rights movements from Jordan were 
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conducted through social media channels, e.g. Facebook and Skype. The interviewees 
were pre-informed about the public nature of the research, and privacy has been assured 
to those who need it. The questions were neutralized. We started with the questions set 
for the research and personalized the questions for the selected movements from each 
country. Some questions emerged during interviews based on the input and the topics 
brought up by the participants. Some of the interviews were recorded in mp3 format, 
and the participants were informed about recording. The interviews were conducted in 
English and Arabic languages, depending on the preference of the participants. The 
outcome of the interviews was used for data triangulation based on the needs that 
emerged during the research.  
 
f) Finally, the grounded theory is inducted. The conclusion contains the answers to the 
key questions. We conclude with further recommendations based on the challenges and 
solutions identified during the research, and a list of limitations and needs for possible 
further researches.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is organized in six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction on the subject and 
methodology of the research, and it identifies the premises and the goals. In this chapter, the 
initial key findings based on the reviewed literature are structured and the methodology is 
verified. The key findings are addressed in the hypothesis and the research questions. 
Limitations and ethical considerations are outlined throughout the thesis.  
In the second chapter, an interdisciplinary analysis is conducted. Theories on the concept of 
women’s movements and their influence on the different stages of public policy making are 
reviewed in connection to the political responsiveness during the democratization process. The 
theoretical frame reviews feminist movements as women’s rights movements that aim to 
change public policies toward gender equality, and how the democratization process provides 
further opportunities or imposes challenges on them. Further on, this theoretical conceptual 
framework is illustrated on the cases of Jordan and Tunisia, to give the reader an idea about 
women’s rights movements and the political reforms after the Arab Spring in both countries. 
In this chapter, challenges which women’s rights movements are facing have emerged. The 
topic is current and the study timeline is put after the Arab Spring, between 2011 to 2018. 
Therefore, data triangulation is made by reviewing secondary resources, grey literature and 
interviewing activists. Finally, we conclude by identifying three main challenges which the 
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studied women’s rights movements face. These challenges are explored in the following 
chapters. 
The third chapter explores the first challenge: “Political Islam is an obstacle to legislate public 
policies on gender equality”. First, we review the literature on political Islam and the legislation 
of Sharia laws. We identify the relation between Sharia laws and policies on gender equality. 
We conceptualize the frames of making of constitutions through the Lancaster model and 
popular participation in Jordan and Tunisia. Then we analyse the transformation from the 
Lancaster model to popular participation during the democratization process in Tunisia and the 
absence of this transformation in Jordan. We review the amendments to the Constitutions 
which were made in Jordan and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. We review the channels which 
opened for popular participation as part of the political reforms in Tunisia and the political 
liberalization from the top in Jordan. We analyse the life cycles of Women’ Rights Movement 
to constitutionalize gender equality. We illustrate how the Islamic identity in the Constitution 
and political Islam was used by the opposition. The women’s rights movement managed to 
constitutionalize gender equality in Tunisia. But their current mobilization for gender equality 
in inheritance is combated by a wide Islamic opposition. By analysing the Islamic narratives, 
we find that equality in inheritance is not compatible with Sharia laws. CEDAW treaty by the 
UN emerged through the literature as a potential solution. Yet, a research is still needed due 
the rejection of this treaty. The rejection seemed to be triggered by the post-colonial identity. 
Further research is needed to analyse the influence of CEDAW treaty after the political changes 
after the Arab Spring. We suggest a cross-Arab treaty as a possible solution to replace 
international treaties to combat discrimination against Arab Women. 
The fourth chapter analyses the second challenge which emerged: “State feminism and co-
optation of women’s rights movements”. First a theoretical analysis is conducted on the types 
of state-feminism and the types of co-optation. The theoretical-conceptual framework is 
applied in Jordan and Tunisia. The co-optation of elite and depoliticization of women’s rights 
movements emerged in Jordan in the specific case of nationality law. The history of state 
feminism in using women’s rights movements to cover up corruption and nepotism emerged 
in Tunisia, in the specific case of equal inheritance law. The mechanism and life cycles of the 
selected Women’s Rights Movements is analysed. We identify the socio-economic gape 
between women in Tunisia as one of the main challenges for women’s rights movements to 
achieve equality in inheritance law. We suggest intersectional feminism as a tool to combat 
selective feminism and the depoliticization of Women’s rights Movements. In Jordan, the 
authoritarian regime is co-opting its political elite to expand its base. This co-optation is 
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contributing in selective feminism. Thus, intersectional feminism could be a good tool to 
combat co-optation by mass mobilization. Yet, this recommendation for Jordan might not be 
valid because the regime in Jordan is identified as not free by Freedom House. Freedom of 
expression has its restrictions when it comes to the criticism of the regime. Thus, mass 
mobilization is restricted.  
The fourth chapter explores the third challenge “Islam as a socio-political ideology is an 
obstacle to implement gender equality policies”. We analyse theories on the implementation of 
policies and how social movements influence this stage of policy responsiveness. The 
theoretical conceptual frame addresses the success of social movements through three strands: 
Changing policies, being part of policy making and the changing of social value. We analyse 
the determinant factors proposed by Nilsen (2015). The Islamic narratives enforce victim blame 
on women who are victims of sexual assaults. This social stigma on women caused by the 
Islamic narratives hinder women from reporting on sexual assaults and rape. Thus, the 
movements to abolish marry-your-rapist law shall combat these narratives. To ensure the 
abolishment of the law from practice as it was abolished on a legislation level. 
The sixth chapter contains the conclusion with the main key findings and the grounded theory. 
The hypothesis is inducted through an intersectional interpretation for the key findings. The 
conclusion identifies the limitations, the further needs and research gap. We conclude with 
further recommendations and suggestions to enhance the role of women’s rights movements to 
















2 Theoretical observations on Women’s Movements and policy making in 
democratization 
 
2.1  Literature review on Women’s Movements, Policy making and Democratization 
Many academics and practitioners have addressed the topic of women’s movements. 
Researchers agree on the complexity of defining what precisely women’s movements are 
(McBride and G. Mazur, 2008). Different scholars have used the term women’s movements 
interchangeably with feminist movements (Banaszak, 2006; Gelb, 2003). But in more recent 
studies, academics like professor Amanda Gouws argue that women’s movement differs from 
feminism in Africa, because they are not necessary mobilized to challenge patriarchy. Gouws 
gives an example from some African traditional societies, where women are mobilized to keep 
the role of women as mothers and their duties in child care and housekeeping (Gouws, 2015).  
McBride and G. Mazur have developed a definition of women’s movements as collective 
actions which are explicitly organized by women to address claims in public life. These claims 
are based on gendered identities of women (McBride and G. Mazur 2008, p.226). Mansbridge 
(1996), described these claims as building on goals emotionally supported among women. Yet, 
these claims are not necessary supported by all groups of women, as women are not a 
homogeneous group. This was for example the case in Jordan, where certain women’s 
movements countered the women’s movements asking for the ratification of the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women CEDAW (Women of the 
Jordanian Islamic Action Front, 2010). This goes in line with the definition developed by 
McBride and G. Mazur, according to which women’s movements are identified by the 
discourse and the actors. The discourse shall be around the gendered identity of women and 
the actors shall be women. They refer to the elements in the movement as an indicator to 
observe if the women movement exists or not. Therefore, the different qualities in the 
movement do not determine if one movement is greater or better than the other (McBride and 
G. Mazur, 2008, p.227). Following this definition, both movements in Jordan, the one pushing 
for the ratification of CEDAW and the one opposing it are women’s movements, because the 
main actors in both are women, and the discourse is based on gendered identities.  
On one hand, a clear and measurable aim could be set to differ women’s movements from 
feminist movements, e.g. the aim of women’s movements is to include women and women 
issues, while feminism aims to challenge patriarchy and discrimination against women 
(Beckwith, 2005; Ferree, 2003). But on the other hand, feminism itself is stigmatized in 
different societies (Nabourema, 2017; Alkhawaja, 2015; Lennox, 2011). Researchers using the 
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word feminism could sometimes be judged just for using the term, while study participants 
might not feel comfortable being identified as feminists, even if they are campaigning for 
women’s rights and gender equality (Alkhawaja, 2015, pp.114,115). Therefore, for the purpose 
of clarity, the term women’s rights movements is used in this research to describe women’s 
movements that are campaigning for women’s rights and gender equality. i.e. for a feminist 
cause (Hawkesworth, 2007, 1997; Beasley, 1999). These movements will be referred to as 
women’s rights movements, as used by other researchers who conducted relevant research in 
the Arab region (Alvi, 2015, pp.294–315).  
Some have argued that the term feminism is part of Westernization (Mohieddin Ahmed, 2017; 
Qutb, Affan, Marzouk & bin Shaker Sharif, 2006). A possible approach to combat this 
argument can be by considering the challenges of validity when identifying concepts (Adcock 
and Collier, 2001). According to Adcock and Collier (2001, pp.529–546), one of the mistakes 
committed by researchers is to neglect that the conceptualization is affected by the context of 
the research. Therefore, for the validity of content, it is important to systemize the concept, 
while refining the indicators. The concept is usually a stable base to a certain extent. Yet, 
through conceptual innovation and through inducting the indicators, the concept is structured 
to fit into the specific study case. This creates an accountable interrelation between the 
background concept and the selected cases to implement the studied concept. In support to this 
approach, Ackerly and True (2010) have answered the question about the good of feminist 
theory to the feminist empirical research. They have concluded that if the researchers focus on 
the questions and the dilemmas of their research, then they correctly apply the theories by 
questioning them within the globalization aspect. This “case-oriented content validation” 
approach (Adcock and Collier 2001, p.539) prevents the researchers from studying feminism 
only from a western point of view in the selected study cases, i.e. Arab Muslim countries. By 
analysing the role of Women’s Rights Movements in shaping public policies in Jordan and 
Tunisia, we contribute to clarifying the concept of feminism in the Arab world. Yet, further in-
depth research is still needed to define feminism of the Arab world.  
Feminism has been defined as a common goal of different ideologies, political and social 
movements to achieve equality between sexes (Beasley, 1999, pp.3–11). Rosemarie Tong has 
traced the roots of liberal feminism, describing it as a movement and an ideology that aims to 
reach individual and liberal rights between sexes through laws and legal reforms (Tong, 1992, 
pp.11–45). Jaggar has associated the concept of reason to the concept of liberation, saying that 
reason can be a restriction to individual liberty or an assist for self-fulfilment, depending on 
whether the reason is interpreted from the moral or prudential aspect (Jaggar, 1983, p.33). 
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When we reflect on this concept of reason in the concept of laws, we may find that women 
were not allowed to vote as they were perceived as morally committed to household rather than 
participants in the public sphere. It was against morals for women to compete with men 
(Suffrage Collection, 1851–2009 (Bulk: 1880s–1920s), n.d.). While women in Saudi Arabia 
were not allowed to drive, as it is deemed immoral for women to leave the house alone without 
a “Mahram”. According tothe interpretations by the country’s Islamic leaders, women shall not 
drive cars, because if they do, they will spread immorality. They will seduce men and the rate 
of crimes will increase (Saudi women driving the car, 2011). “Mahram” is an Arabic word, 
meaning the men whom a woman cannot marry due to blood relation or because they were 
breastfed by the same woman (“Who are the mahrams in front of whom a woman can 
uncover?”, 1999).  
Samkange has analysed the impact of liberal feminist approach on gender inequalities in 
Zimbabwe. She argues that despite the improvements in education, employment and equal pay 
policies, a more radical approach is still needed for actual tangible gender equality on the 
ground. She corroborates her argument with the low political representation of women, and the 
socio-economic inequalities due to the ignorance of law and male chauvinism. She also 
mentions the positive impact of the International Policy Framework and Regional Policy Frame 
on the national gender policies of the country (Samkange, 2015). The radical approach 
recommended by Samkange means the radical feminist approach. Crow has collected primary 
resources and documents by radical feminists since the start of the second wave of feminism 
in the 1960s. She reviewed the efforts and approach of radical feminism in challenging 
chauvinism and patriarchy. The efforts of radical feminists are to go further beyond legal and 
political reforms to challenge and change the socio-cultural structure that supports glass 
ceilings and patriarchy (Crow, 2000, pp.64–90). Erny has analysed the relation between gender 
and democratization in Serbia. The author concludes with the connection between 
democratization and the liberal feminist theory, with legal and political reforms being essential 
to both, liberal feminism and democratization. Looking at Serbia as an example of an European 
Union candidate country, he notes the positive impact of this candidacy on the reforms taken 
at a legislations level. The author also examines gender inequalities in Serbia as a socio-cultural 
structure, where legal reforms are insufficient in challenging the patriarchy and are not 
implemented in practice (Erny, 2014). Thus, both scholars, Samkange and Erny, claim that a 
radical approach is needed for achieving gender equality and equity.  
On the other hand, Ruiz claims that domination and radicalization in the concept of gender 
equality go against the values of democracy. She recommends the acceptance of cultural 
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differences regarding the concept of gender in different societies. She claims that it is one 
western story about gender equality that has been taken in consideration so far. To assure 
democracy, she recommends moderation and tolerance to the variety of gender concepts and 
gender roles in different societies and cultures, while only rejecting explicit violations that limit 
the natural development of gender relations. She argues that the low political participation of 
women in some countries does not necessary indicate the oppression of women, as it might 
suggest a certain gender role accepted by men and women alike. She uses the veil from the 
Islamic practice as an example. She claims that the western narratives perceive women with 
the veil as oppressed, while in fact most of the women, if not all, wear it with self-determination 
and for self-empowerment (Ruiz, 2013, pp.108–123). 
On the other hand, the Arab Egyptian feminist and scholar Nawal Al Saadawi has on the other 
hand highlighted the veil as subjugation of women. She recommends a legislative ban on the 
veil and other religious symbols, and she refers to women who wear the veil as brainwashed 
(Nawal El Saadawi: on feminism, fiction and the illusion of democracy, 2018; Nawal El 
Saadawi: Egypt's radical feminist, 2010). Hence, between the two different paths and 
arguments of the liberal feminist approach and the radical feminist approach, more empirical 
research is needed to deliver an accurate bottom-up research on the demands and the struggles 
of women’s rights movements in the Arab Muslim world. 
From the public policy point of view, the influence of social movements on public policy 
making process can be examined through the different stages of political responsiveness (Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006, p.230). Shumaker has identified five different stages of political 
responsiveness: Access responsiveness, Agenda responsiveness, Policy responsiveness, 
Output responsiveness and Impact responsiveness. Policy responsiveness stands for policies, 
legislations (Schumaker, 1975, pp.494, 495). A recent literature review shows that the majority 
of scholars have studied democratic responsiveness through policy responsiveness (Esaiasson 
and Wlezien, 2016, 1–13). Esaiasson and Wlezien note that policy responsiveness is an 
important factor in democratic responsiveness. But the emphasis on it undermine the 
importance of the reaction of citizens after the responsive actions are taken by politicians. They 
highlight the importance of public responsiveness through feedback as an incentive for the 
politicians to be responsive, and as a channel to get informed about the public needs. In other 
words, the outcome responsiveness and impact responsiveness, which measure whether the 




During the democratization process in Spain and Portugal between 1970 and 1980, the policy 
responsiveness to women’s movements was faster in Portugal. Melo has analysed the relation 
between the type of democratic transition and the success of women’s movements in reaching 
their demands for public policies on gender equality. The author compared the revolutionary 
transition in Portugal to the transition through consensus and negotiation in Spain. In Portugal, 
the left parties that supported European left parties for gender equality were the major actors 
in the transition. The author describes it as a revolutionary transition where the leftist parties 
were the majority in the government and constantly promoted the demands from radical social 
movements in a revolutionary manner. Consequently, women’s movements were successful in 
promoting their demands for divorce, equal pay, equal parental rights, economic equality 
within the marriage, institutionalization of state feminism and abortion laws in a fast term in 
Portugal comparing to Spain. In Spain, the transition was based on negotiation and consensus. 
Left parties were in the opposition, and they had to compromise with the right-wing parties. It 
subsequently took women’s movements in Spain longer to get their demands, even though they 
were well allied with the left parties (Melo, 2016, pp.2–21). 
Melo (2016), identified the democratic transition, its type and the opportunities as the main 
factors for the success in reforming public policies on gender equality. While Ghazali et al 
(2016, pp.23-34) paid more attention to the emergence of counter movements to women’s 
rights movements during the democratic transition in Indonesia, and their access to the public 
policy arena. They determined four factors that affect the process and the success of women’s 
rights advocacy. The mutual combination between 1. Democratization and decentralization; 2. 
The religious and cultural ideology; 3. The existence of women’s movements; and 4. The 
influence of international organizations. Applying qualitative feminist research methodology, 
the authors found that democratic transition has created new opportunities for women’s 
advocacy. Yet, they argue it also strengthened religious organizations and movements that 
oppose women’s rights movements. The study reviewed Sharia, customary and national laws. 
It noted that Sharia and customary laws are an obstacle for women’s advocacy not only when 
it comes to legal reforms, but also in the implementation of national laws.  
Eddyono et al (2016, pp.125, 126) recommended an alliance of women’s movements in 
Indonesia to develop strategies in order to weaken the religious opposition. They refer to the 
possible tension which appears when the policy’s nature is in contradiction with some religious 
and cultural norms. Yet, the authors recognized the support of religious leaders as a factor that 
makes women’s movements more influential. This contradicts Melo’s findings from Liberia. 
Because the authors referred to the consensus between women’s rights movements and the 
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Islamic leaders as an enabler factor. The Islamic leaders in Indonesia could be compared to the 
conservative right in Spain in terms of their opposition to some demands from the women’s 
rights movements. Further, Ghazali et al, point out that even if Indonesians women’s rights 
movements manage to change public policies on a national level, there is a possibility that 
certain policies will not be implemented in practice due to the existence of Sharia laws 
(Ghazali, Warlif, Velayati & Ciciek, 2016, pp.23–34).  
Interpretations of Islam as a socio-political ideology to challenge patriarchy and achieve full 
equality between genders got to be known globally as Islamic Feminism in the 1990s (Islamic 
feminism: what's in a name?, 2002). Scholars face challenges in agreeing on a definition for 
the expression Islamic Feminism. This is due to the complex definition of feminism on one 
hand, and the question of how to define Islam on the other (A. Grami 2013, pp.103–111). 
Another controversial debate is whether Islam and feminism can be combined in one 
expression. Some argue that at the terminological level, Islam means a socio-political ideology. 
But Feminism is a socio-political ideology that is based on secularism rather than religion 
(Ahmad, 2017, pp.1–5). At the conceptual level, Mojab argues in her study of Islamic feminism 
in Iran that Islamic feminism has come to a dead-end. She claims that the Islamization of gender 
relations has created a patriarchal system that cannot be fixed by legal reforms (2001, pp.124–
146). While Ambar Ahmad asserts that Islamic feminism has helped activists and young 
women address feminism without it getting rejected as a western product. The author argues 
that Islamic feminism has had a positive impact and has advanced gender equality and justice 
on the legal and social levels (Ahmad, 2017, pp.1–11).  
Based on a literature review from the geographical aspect, we have summed up four points for 
our further conceptualization of women’s rights movements and public policy making after the 
Arab Spring: 1. Women’s movements differ from feminism, and the term feminism has a 
negative connotation in some countries. Consequently, we use the expression Women’s rights 
movements in this research, while applying the case-oriented validation concept. Hence, we 
will develop the concept of selected women’s rights movements in Jordan and Tunisia with a 
bottom-up approach; 2. The type of democratic transition affects the process of gender public 
policy making, as was the case of Spain and Portugal. We will thus consider the type of 
transition as a factor that affects the role of women’s rights movements in reforming public 
policies. The political liberalization initiated from the top in Jordan, and the transformation 
from Lancaster model to the popular participation in Tunisia; 3. The international community 
has influence in speeding up the process of legal reforms. Examples of this are the positive 
impact of International Policy Framework and Regional Policy Frame on the national gender 
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equality policies in Zimbabwe, and the reforms of gender equality public policies during the 
democratic transition in Serbia. However, legal reforms do not necessary lead to their 
implementation on the ground. Thus, we will consider the role of women’s rights movements 
also through the stages of political responsiveness, and not only policy responsiveness; 4. In 
countries where Islam is a socio-political ideology, Sharia laws might be in contradiction with 
gender equality public policies, which is for example the case in Indonesia, where 
democratization has strengthened cultural and religious actors. We will consider the 
interactions between women’s rights movements and political Islam in Jordan and Tunisia. 
since both countries are identified as Muslim Arab countries in their Constitutions.  
 
2.2 Women’s movements and gender discriminatory policies after the Arab Spring 
Feminist movements in the Arab world have been defined from different perspectives by 
different scholars (Hollis, 2013). On one hand, Lazerg has criticized Western feminists for 
applying the Foucauldian approach in a model which objectifies Arab women as an area of 
study. She gives the example of the veil case, where western feminists applied the approaches 
from the first wave of feminism to identify the veil as a sign of oppression, and Islam as a 
patriarchal oppressive ideology. Later on, by applying the approaches from the second wave 
of feminism, western feminists have viewed the veil as a sign of resistance and combating 
oppression. The author argues that between these two views, no third option was left (Lazerg, 
1988). On the other hand, activists and scholars like Nawal Al Saadawi have criticised scholars 
who associate women liberation with the west, and rejected the idea that feminism was initiated 
by American women. She argues that the first wave of feminism should not be restricted as a 
Western invention in the first place. She notes that women’s struggle is universal. All women 
around the globe and throughout the history had to fight for their rights. She argues that 
feminism is “embedded in the culture and the struggle of all women all over the world”. She 
sees the veil as oppression of women. She argues that religious education has brainwashed 
women who accept certain Islamic practices such as the veil or polygamy for men and 
monogamy for women. Thus, she asserts that it is not correct to see the first wave of feminism 
as invented by American women in the first place (Channel 4 news, 2018). Hence, there is a 
tension when it comes to identifying women’s rights movements in relation to religion or 
secularism in the Arab world. 
The Arab Spring has also brought a wide debate on women’s rights movements in the Arab 
world. Many have wondered whether the Arab Spring was the new spring of Arab women 
(Sjoberg and Whooly, 2015). At the mobilization level, one can agree on the important role 
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that women played with their partners during the Arab Springuprisings (C. Radsch, 2012; 
Heidman and Youssef, 2012; Cole & Cole, 2011). Kobaissy, an activist from Yemen, indicates 
that women’s participation in the public sphere has increased even in the countries witnessing 
humanitarian crises (Kobaissy, 2017). Yet, different scholars have different views on the role 
that women’s movements have played in Arab countries after the Arab Spring. Price et al. argue 
that the Arab Spring caused an increase in women’s mobilization even after the uprisings. The 
authors paid special attention to the case of Egypt (Price, Rizzo, Marty and Meyer, 2017). 
While Ferguson deems the role of women after the Arab Spring as insufficient, saying they did 
not use the opportunities provided by the Arab Spring to improve the status of women in 
Jordan. Ferguson argued that the depoliticization of women organization was the main cause 
(Ferguson, 2017, 59–68). Zaidan, on the contrary, argues that advocates for women’s rights in 
Jordan are using the most convenient mobilization for the current political system. She 
recommends that they should continue with their strategic mobilization in “Jordan’s middle 
political system” (Zaidan, 2013, p.42).  
Another controversial debate following the Arab Spring revolves around the rise of political 
Islam as a threat on women’s rights (Bayoumy, 2013; Council on Foreign Relation, 2012). In 
regard to Islam, Khimish argues that conservative traditions rather than religion are the reason 
behind women’s disempowerment in the Arab World. She makes a distinction between religion 
and traditions. She argues that Quran itself is not patriarchal, but it is the Islamic leaders who 
interpret it in a patriarchal way (Khimish, 2014). On the hand, Islamic scholars see Sharia laws 
as the laws that cannot be changed. They are based on Quran, and Quran is the word of God. 
Islamic leaders differentiate between Sharia laws and Fiqh. The latter is different scholars’ 
understanding of the issues in their current times, while Sharia laws are not negotiable nor 
reversible (Ibrahim, 2012).  
Shaaban (2018) wrote in response to the women’s rights movements who demand gender 
equality in the inheritance law in Tunisia, labelling their demand as an attack on Islam led by 
the west. Tunisian Islamic scholars and leaders conducted a live stream press conference where 
they said the decisions of President Essebsi contradicted Quran and Sharia laws. President 
Essebsi announced the abolishment of the law that forbid Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslim men, and demanded equality in inheritance between women and men (Shemsfm, 
2017).  
There are commonalities between movements in the Arab world. Women’s movements across 
the Arab region after the Arab Spring have mainly become mobilized to abolish and reform 
laws that discriminate against them (Luck, 2017), for example the Women to Drive movement 
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advocating for the right of Saudi Women to drive the car (The Guardian, 2011), the current 
mobilization of Lebanese and Jordanian women to gain their right to pass their nationality to 
their children (Farfour, 2018; Al Sarayra, 2018), the mobilization of Moroccan and Tunisian 
women for equal inheritance law (Nadority, 2017), and the recent success of Women’s rights 
movements in Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia in their efforts to abolish marry-your-rapist law 
(Dehnert, 2017). The marry-your-rapist law is a law that frees the perpetrators of sexual assault 
from any charges if they marry their victims (Osman, 2018). However, their struggle goes 
beyond the legislative level. Several campaigns initiated by women’s rights movements in 
different Arab countries aim to end sexual harassment of women in practice (The Jordan times, 
2016; Center for Research, Studies, Documentation and Information on Women, 2017) 
In addition to the existence of common gender discriminatory policies in Arab countries, some 
agree that countries that are identified as Arab-Muslim have other similarities when it comes 
to the women’s status due to cultural and religious identities (Fyfe, 2013). However, this is not 
a homogeneous group, and women’s rights movements have experienced different processes 
and outcomes in different countries after the Arab Spring. For example, women’s rights 
movements in Iraq celebrated after the parliament withdrew the proposed amendment to reduce 
the legal age of marriage for girls to 9, which was proposed by Shia Islamist conservative 
deputies (Human Rights Watch, 2017), and the celebration of women’s rights movements in 
Tunisia after the abolishment of the law that forbid women from marrying non-Muslim men. 
This was opposed by Islamists in the country (Religion News Service, 2017). 
In light of the current debates on women’s rights movements, Islam, the Arab Spring and 
gender discriminatory policies in the Arab world, we will further review recent women’s rights 
movements in Jordan and Tunisia. We will review their mobilization to reform gender 
discriminatory policies between 2011 and 2018. We will explore the specifics of each country, 
while creating a general frame, which can be applied in further studies on women’s rights 
movements in the Arab world. 
 
2.2.1 Review of gender discriminatory policies and women’s rights movement in Jordan 
The uprisings known globally as the Arab Spring reached Jordan in 2011 with protests across 
the country. the Monarchy initiated certain political reforms in response to the demonstrations, 
which were inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (Alsoudi, 2014). Koprulu (2012) 
argues that the regime assumed the strategy of political liberalization: making a political 
reform, followed by oppressive actions in order to keep control over the country. Ferguson 
(2017), has conducted a qualitative research after the Arab Spring in Jordan, where he examines 
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the depoliticization of women’s rights movements and the culture of fear as a result of the 
political liberalization strategy used by the regime. He looks for the reason for the failure to 
advance women’s rights and to change the status of women in Jordan in the depoliticization 
and the failure of leadership of women’s movements. However, he did not address the Islamic 
narratives that countered women’s rights movements in Jordan on specific issues, such as 
ratifying the CEDAW treaty on the elimination of all types of discrimination against women, 
or the opposing Islamic views regarding the inclusion of the word gender in the equality article 
in the Jordanian Constitution (Tahboub, 2011). 
In 2011, King Abdullah II appointed a royal committee to propose political reforms and 
amendments to the Constitution (On the occasion of presenting the suggested Constitutional 
amendments by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review | King Abdullah II Official 
Website, 2011). Women’s rights advocates started to lobby for the inclusion of the word gender 
in article 6 of the Jordanian Constitution. But they did not succeed (Sweiss, 2012). Article 6 
states that all Jordanians are equal before the law, regardless to their religion, race and 
language. The word Jordanian in Arabic has two forms. “Al Ordonyon” is the male plural form 
and the “Al Ordonyat” is the female plural form. Only the word “Al Ordonyon” is included in 
the Jordanian Constitution (The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, art. 6.1), 
which is vague and ambiguous. Part of the 2011 political reforms was the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court. It was an amendment proposed by the royal committee and approved by 
King Abdullah. Thus, if the word gender is added and clarified in the Constitution, this might 
contribute to the right of women’s rights movements to challenge laws that discriminate against 
them before the Constitutional Court. Rashida Manjoo, the United Nations special rapporteur 
on violence against women, has emphasized the importance of including the word gender and 
sex in article 6 of the Jordanian Constitution. She maintains that this step will help change the 
policies that discriminate against women, and send a clear message to the society as a whole 
that Jordanian women are equal to Jordanian men (Manjoo, 2011).  
Women’s rights groups and organizations are still demanding the inclusion of a gender equality 
article in the new Constitution. On Women Day in 2017, different women’s groups and 
organizations emphasized the importance of clarifying the concept of gender equality in the 
Constitution (Husseini, 2017). There were three amendments to the Jordanian Constitution in 
2011, 2014 and 2016, but women’s rights advocates did not manage to include the gender 
equality article in any of these phases. The Royal Committee appointed by the king of Jordan 
claims that the word “Al Ordonyon” in its male form indicates all Jordanian citizens, women 
and men, so it would not be logical to add the word gender to the article (The exclusion of the 
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word "gender" in the Constitution al amendments in Jordan, 2011). The Royal Committee was 
appointed by the King to propose amendments to the Constitution. The committee did not 
include female members. In his official letter to the committee, King Abdullah recommended 
the committee to consult with the National Committee for Dialogue (Royal Commission for 
the Revision of the Constitution, 2011). The National Committee for Dialogue was also not 
elected, but was appointed by the Prime Minister, who was appointed by the King (Council of 
Ministers, 2011). Thus, the political liberalization was achieved through a Lancaster model 
rather than popular participation. Abla Abu Elbeh, Secretary General of the Jordanian People’s 
Democratic Party and a former member of Parliament said it was failure of women’s rights, as 
the appointed National Dialogue Committee had only four women among its 52 members. Ms. 
Abu Elbeh also emphasized the importance of including the word gender in the equality article 
(Abu Elbeh, 2012).  
On one hand, one might argue that the Jordanian regime will not approve the 
constitutionalization of gender equality, as this would give many women who are married to 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan the right to object before the Constitutional Court in order to 
gain nationalities for their spouses and children (Kaddoumi, 2011). On the other hand, the 
spokesperson of the Islamic Front Party, Dr. Dima Tahboub has accused women’s rights 
movements that want to include the word gender in the equality article of the Constitution of 
being the traitors of the Jordanian society. She claims that these women’s right movements are 
following western agendas, and want to violate the cultural identity of the Jordanian society by 
destroying the concept of family, and have a further plan to legalize homosexuality. She 
emphasizes the role of women as wives and mothers. She claims that women’s rights 
movements want to categorize these natural roles as gender inequalities, and hence destroy the 
concept of the Jordanian family and society (Tahboub, 2011). She calls the women’s rights 
movements “Al Nasaywe”, which means feminists in Arabic (Almaany, n.d.).  
The Islamic Action Front is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Dr. Dima Tahboub 
is the first woman to be appointed as media spokesperson for the Islamic Party (Jordan's 
Brotherhood, 2014). Tahboub expressed the support to women’s rights movements in their 
efforts to reform the policy that does not give them the right to pass their nationality to their 
children and partners (Tahboub, 2017). Yet, representing the Islamic Party, she opposes the 
demands to clarify the gender equality article by adding the word gender to the Jordanian 
Constitution, and she opposes the ratification of the CEDAW treaty. Ibrahim Hassan, an 
Islamic Brotherhood member, also claims that he is pro women’s rights, but not pro equality, 
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as God created women and men different, and they have different roles. In the same interview 
he emphasised that certain jobs, e.g. leadership positions, are made for men (Hassan, 2018).  
On the other hand, the Jordanian government has undertaken measures, while internationally 
announcing that it is for gender equality. It increased women quotas from 12 to 15 as part of 
the political reform after the Arab Spring in 2012 (The Carter Center, 2013). In June 2018, a 
huge demonstration spread around the capital of Amman and other cities in Jordan. People 
were primarily opposing the new taxation law, enforced by the International Monetary Fund 
(Sweis, 2018). In response to the protests, King Abdullah II dismissed Prime Minister Hany al 
Mulqi and his government, and appointed Dr. Al Razaz as the new PM. The new government 
led by Dr. Al Razaz appointed seven female ministers for the first time in the history of Jordan 
(Prime Ministry, 2018). However, in his speech to the government and in response to some 
parliamentary members’ questions regarding the nationality law, he only promised to review 
the documents issued to stateless Bedouins and their validity. He did not address Jordanian 
women’s rights to pass their nationality to their partners and children (Parliament of Jordan, 
2018). This right remains restricted to Jordanian men.  
In September 2017, the Jordanian government issued special ID cards to children of Jordanian 
women who cannot obtain the nationality due to foreign fathers. Yet, people who are concerned 
reported difficulties in gaining work permits and services due to the lack of a follow-up from 
the authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This is not the first time where affected people 
reported the failure to implement legislated policies. An example from gender public policies 
is the legal provision in Jordan, which was supposed to prevent gender-based discrimination 
through measures such as “paid maternity leave and day-care for working mothers”. But 
according to the report by Freedom House, these policies are used and manipulated by the 
business sector to not hire women from in first place (Freedom House, 2016). Thus, policy 
responsiveness is not necessarily sufficient to alleviate the grievance of the target group, as 
legislated policies are not necessary implemented in practice (Makinde, 2005). Funds and 
personnel were not allocated by the officials to make sure that the policy passes from “Policy 
responsiveness” to “Output responsiveness” (Schumaker, 1975, pp.494,495).  
In addition to the dilemmas regarding the nationality law and constitutionalizing gender 
equality, there are more policies in Jordan that are directly discriminating against women. The 
personal status code does not give Muslim women the right to marry non-Muslim men. 
Meanwhile, it gives Muslim men the right to marry non-Muslim women. The penal code is 
also discriminating against women. Crimes of honour in Jordan are a phenomenon, where men 
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can face reduced charges if they kill women from their family due to honour. The honour of a 
family might be harmed for a variety of reasons related to women, for example, if she has a 
boyfriend or if she acted in a way that brought rumours and bad reputation to the family 
(Amnesty International, 2017/2018). A woman who passed through the threat of being killed 
due to honour gave an account of how she was kidnapped by her brother. He drove her in the 
car while threatening to kill her with a gun and bury her out of the capital city of Amman, after 
some relatives reported to him that she was hanging out with men in bars on the western side 
of the city. After one hour of negotiation, she managed to convince her brother that this story 
was made up and eventually she managed to save her life (Interview in person, 2018, June 3, 
Appendix B). 
The government amended article 98, which freed the perpetrators of honour crime from any 
chargers (Amnesty International, 2017/2018), it however kept the article that stipulates reduced 
charges for those who murder their spouses after they find out that they have committed 
adultery (World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Jordan, 2018). 
In 2017, women’s rights movements celebrated the abolishment of article 308, which used to 
free the rapists from the charges if they married their victims (Euromed Feminist Initiative, 
2017). The Sisterhood is Global Institute office in Jordan released a study which shows that 
42% of the surveyed Jordanians believe that the refusal of the victims to marry their rapists 
would result in their killing by their family members to protect the family honour, while 73% 
of the surveyed Jordanians believe that victims marry their rapists in fear of shame and for 
honour (The Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI), 2015). Thus, this brings up some concerns 
whether the abolishment of this law at the legislation level will end this phenomenon in 
practice. 
  
2.2.2 Review of gender discriminatory policies and women’s rights movements in Tunisia 
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia in 2010. The uprisings ended in Tunisia by the escape of 
the former dictator Bin Ali, in 2011 to Saudi Arabia. The known story in global media is about 
Bouazizi a hard-working poor vendor who was trying to make a living in a corrupted society 
and an unequal system of hierarchy and nepotism. Him and other vendors have been dismissed 
from a certain area several times by police. Bouazizi insisted to stay in that area to sell 
vegetables and to make a living for himself and his family. After he was slapped by a municipal 
inspector he went to the municipality and government office to complain and to get his 
equipment back. Witnesses asserted that as he was at the government office he got insulted and 
then he set himself on fire. His self-immolation triggered the spark of what have become known 
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as the “Arab Spring” (Fahim, 2011; Abouzeid, 2011). The uprisings started in Tunisia to spread 
fast to other Arab countries like Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Bahrain, etc. Thousands of people across 
different Arab countries have went to the streets asking for justice freedom and equality. The 
uprisings where recorded by activists and journalists. People were chanting the popular Arab 
chant “If people one day wanted to live, then one day destiny shall response” 
(jooimbara1,2011; Wahhabism Watch, 2011; Saudi2014, 2011). The main slogan which spread 
around the demonstrations across the Arab world was “Al Shaab yored Iskat al Netham” which 
means the people want the fall of the regime (Spindel, 2011). 
The second story from the Arab Spring is about the municipality inspector who was accused 
of slapping Bouazizi. She was a woman known by the name Fadia Hamdi. In different 
interviews, Fadia claimed that she did not slap Bouazizi, but people did not like her doing her 
job as a police officer because she was a woman. In different interviews she said that women 
in the Arab world were expected to be submissive, and that if she was a male police officer, 
the Arab Spring would not happen (Hamdi, 2011; Salbi and Reticker, 2013). But in another 
story, the Arab Spring in Egypt started due to a female activist, Asma Mahfouz. She became a 
symbol for the Egyptian revolution and her video went virial before the revolution on 25 
January 2011. Asma Mahfouz wrote about the four Egyptian young men who set themselves 
on fire, inspired by Bouazizi in Tunisia. They set themselves on fire in order to keep the spark 
of the revolution burning. Mahfouz described it as their appeal for similar equality, freedom 
and justice as gained by the Tunisians. (Mahfouz, 2011; Democracy now, 2011). 
Highlighting the police officer who slapped Bouazizi as a woman who presented the 
authoritarian regime is in some way similar to the findings of C. Murphy. The author addressed 
how the former dictator regimes in Tunisia have used the feminist card to legislate their 
oppressive actions on their opposition. The author addressed how Ben Ali regime have used 
women’s rights card to legalize his dictatorship while oppressing female activists and 
depoliticizing women’s organization (C. Murphy, 2003, pp.172–176). El Masri, describes how 
the regime of Ben Ali has used women’s rights as a tool in bragging with the Islamic opposition. 
The former first lady in Tunisia has presented women organizations and women’s rights of 
Tunisia, while the authoritarian system was imprisoning anyone who would criticise her or the 
regime of her husband. El Masri, concludes with the description of the current regime of the 
secularist party Nida Tunis, led by President Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi. Essebsi served under 
the previous authoritarian regimes of Ben Ali and his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. The 
previous regimes have given women’s rights with the top-down approach, with the price of co-
opting feminism into the state, while oppressing secular or Islamist female activists if they 
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criticize the regime. El Masri addresses the question whether feminists after the Arab Spring 
are going further to autonomy or back to co-optation. She recommends feminist movements to 
get acknowledged with Quran Verses in order to confront conservatives who want to limit 
women’s rights (El Masri, 2015, pp.125–140). The later recommendation goes with the core 
definition of the controversial expression of Islamic feminism. Badran has described the core 
definition of Islamic feminism is to interpret women’s rights based on Islamic teachings 
(Badran, 2009). The differences rely on the descriptive tools and the used resources. 
The concerns regarding co-optation are being currently expressed by different political and 
social actors. Safa Belghith, a Tunisian researcher, argues that president Essebsi and the 
political elite have chosen to address controversial issues when it comes to religion, such as 
abolishing the law that does not allow Tunisian women to marry non-Muslims and leading an 
initiative for equal inheritance law, while ignoring the voices and the needs of women from 
marginalized areas (Belgith, 2018). While Jialni Hamami, the leader at the Popular Front 
described the recent speech of president Essebsi on Women’s Day as an attempt to co-opt 
women’s voices for his next election campaign, and to use them as a tool to pressure the Al 
Nahda Islamist party. He also exposed it as an attempt from the President to cover up the anti- 
corruption campaign led by Al Shahed, the Tunisian Prime Minister. Al Hamami claims that 
Essebsi tried to sabotage the anti-corruption campaign on several occasions (Hamami, 2017). 
Schemm wrote about the possibility that the current secular regime in Tunisia is using the 
feminist card in order to cover up the adoption of the law that gives old civil servants impunity 
from charges if they pay fines, which is known as the “reconciliation law” (Schemm, 2018).  
Co-optation of feminism is a concern next of other concerns brought up by different local and 
external observers. The concerns are regarding the rise of political Islam after the Arab Spring 
and its threat on women’s rights (Marks, 2013, pp.224–251). Some scholars have argued that 
the rise of political Islam in Tunisia might cause a reversed wave on women’s rights (Marks, 
2013, p.225). While others have argued that Islamist Nahda party has taken a moderate way to 
save the democratic transition in the country (Abdo-Katsipis, 2017). Mr Ghannouchi, the leader 
of Al Nahda party, has declared that he would rather call his party Muslim democrats than 
Islamists. In an interview he clarified that there is no more room for political Islam in the 
democratic transition in Tunisia (Ghannouchi, 2016). Grewal, has conducted a qualitative 
study in Tunisia. The author argues that supporters and members of Al Nahda party who were 
in exile in western countries and did not experience repression under secular democracy will 
most likely be in favour to secular democracy in Tunisia (Grewal, 2018). Mr Ghannouchi, has 
been in exile in London until the fall of ben Ali regime (Reuters Staff, 2011). His later 
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declarations go in line with the findings of Grewal. These findings bring another concern 
regarding the people who elected the al Nahda party due to its Islamic identity. If the elite of 
al Nahda party which is known as the Islamic party is pro secularism then how the discourse 
will go among the other members, and voters who are voting for the Islamic identity of the 
party? 
On the empirical level, one of the main first conflicts between the concepts of political Islam 
and gender equality emerged during the making of the first Tunisian Constitution after the Arab 
Spring. Some members of the Al Nahda Islamic party and other Islamist voices in the country 
refused to include the expression of equality between genders in the Constitution. The Islamists 
wanted to include the word complementary instead of equality. This suggestion was present in 
the draft of the Tunisian Constitution ("Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia", 2012). 
Women representatives and women’s rights movements started their campaign to include 
gender equality in the new Constitution (Daragahi, 2012). It was a victory for women’s rights 
movements when gender equality was included in the new Tunisian Constitution in 2014. Yet, 
as noted in the same article published by the United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA), the 
next challenge is for law makers to amend the laws that do not comply with the 
constitutionalized gender equality (UNFPA, 2014).  
The inheritance law is seen by some as an important element of Islam and the Tunisian Muslim 
identity which is identified by the first article in the Constitution. While others perceive such a 
law as in contradictory to the civil state concept and the gender equality article in the Tunisian 
Constitution (Sherlock, 2017). The Islamic higher assembly has condemned the 
recommendations in the report by the committee for personal freedoms and equality. The report 
contained a recommendation to change the inheritance law in Tunisia for gender equality. The 
Islamic higher assembly has made a declaration that this report is against Sharia laws and 
demanded to edit the report with the presence of an Islamic committee to change the 
recommendations to what fit to the Islamic and Arabic identity of Tunisia (The Islamic higher 
assembly, 2018). The National Coordination for the Defence of the Quran, the Constitution 
and Fair Development, which was established in 2017, is currently running an intensive 
lobbying campaign. They claim that the recommendations and the report by the committee for 
personal freedoms and equality go against the Arabic and Islamic identity of Tunisia (The 
National Coordination for the Defence of the Quran, the Constitution and Fair Development, 
2018). In response to their claims, women’s rights movements are currently mobilized through 
street demonstrations and publicity in the attempt to gain social support for equal inheritance 
law (Amara, 2018).  
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On one hand, women’s rights movements in Tunisia and in Jordan have celebrated the 
abolishment of marry-your-rapist law in 2017. The law freed rapist from any chargers if they 
married their victims. On the other hand, Media Center for Research, Studies, Documentation 
and Information on Women ‘Cardiff’ conducted a qualitative study which revealed that 
violence against women had increased by 74%, and that 90% of sexual violence happened on 
public transport. Ms. Sonyea al Zakre has emphasized that 97% of the victims asserted that 
they would not report on these assaults in fear of getting shamed for it (Center for Research, 
Studies, Documentation and Information on Women ‘Cardiff’, 2016). 
Nilsen (2015, pp.1–13) has determined five approaches to policy implementation. One of them 
is the determinants frameworks which comes under the purpose of understanding what is 
influencing the implementation outcomes. It contains independent variables which can 
influence the outcome of the implementation. This independent variables or factors vary from 
enablers to obstacles. Dr Khimish has analysed the Islamic narratives and its connection on 
women status in the Arab world. She has focused on the issue of Hijab in relation to political 
and economic participation and women status in general. Dr Khimish has concluded with 
findings that many people believes that Islamic teachings have influenced the women social 
status (Khimish, 2014, pp. 132–142). We will analyse the Islamic discourse regarding women 
and sexuality as an independent variable that might hinder or enable the abolishment of marry-
your-rapist law from practice in Jordan and Tunisia.  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion between Jordan and Tunisia:  
There are differences between the democratic transition and political context in Tunisia and in 
Jordan. Yet, there are some main common factors that appeared as independent variables, 
which influence the life cycle and the impact of women’s rights movements on the making of 
public policies. 
These factors are: 1. Political Islam and the Islamic identity: This factor has interacted with 
women’s rights movements seeking to constitutionalize gender equality in both countries; 2. 
State feminism in Jordan increased the political representation of women in the government as 
part of the political reforms after the Arab Spring (International Institute for Democracy and 
electoral assistance, 2018). Yet, some scholars argue that this is a strategy to polish the image 
of the regime internationally while not achieving women empowerment on field (Pietrobelli, 
2013). In Tunisia, the state led by the secular party is also accused by some observers of co-
opting feminism to cover up for corruption and nepotism; 3. The social norms in both countries 
seem initially as an obstacle for abolishing marry-your-rapist law from practice. We will further 
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analyse the Islamic discourse in both countries in relation to the social norms that might hinder 
women from reporting on sexual assaults.  
Jordan and Tunisia are identified as Muslim Arab countries by Constitution. Women’s rights 
movements have managed to constitutionalize gender equality in Tunisia while it failed in 
Jordan. In Tunisia 99% of population are Sunni Muslims (Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor, 2017). In Jordan 93% of population are Sunni Muslims (Pew research centre, 
2011). The global gender gap report for the year 2017 ranks Tunisia in 117 globally, and it 
ranks Jordan in 135 globally (Word Economic Forum, 2017, pp.11, 12). In a study published 
by pew research centre for the year 2013, 93% of interviewed Muslims in Tunisia have 
answered yes to the question “Must a wife always obey her husband?” while 80 % of the 
interviewed Muslims in Jordan have answered yes to the same question. Yet, women in Tunisia 
have always gained more rights than their counterparts in other Arab countries (Abdo-Katsipis, 
2017, p.5). 
Thus, by studying further the three factors mentioned above and their interaction with women’s 
rights movements in the social and political contexts in both countries, we aim to explore 
further similarities or differences. While analysing the role of women’s rights in reforming 






















3 Political Islam and its influence on women’s rights movements 
 
Political Islam is a controversial expression. Professor Ahmed Mohamed Kanaan, who is a 
scholar and member of the Association of International Islamic Literature, explains how 
Islamists prefer using the expression “the implementation of Sharia law” instead of political 
Islam. He argues that political Islam was a term that was invented by scholars who are in favour 
of imperialism and colonization. He said it was a misleading expression used by Arabic secular 
movements who have allied with western foreign politics to shake the image and the reputation 
of Islamic movements. He further argues that this term is used to accuse Islamists of misusing 
Islam to gain political power (Kanaan, 2014). At Encyclopedia.com, political Islam is 
identified as the activities of individuals and organizations that aim to turn the state to an 
Islamic state, or to describe the elements in Islam which are engaged in politics (Political Islam, 
2004). Hirschkind (1997, pp.12–14) explains the controversial debate over the term political 
Islam. He describes how it is used by different scholars as a way to express the attempts of 
different activists and movements to include Islam in the politics and governance. Scholars use 
this term to distinguish political Islam from personal piety and practices. He explains that in 
the past political Islam was not present, because the power of the state was not as influential as 
nowadays. He associates the need to create an Islamic state to the need of practicing Islam in 
social life because the state has expanded its institutional influence. 
Based on these explanations and definitions, we use the term Political Islam in this research in 
the meaning of the implementation of Islamic laws, and to describe the activities of movements, 
activists and organizations that want to apply Islamic laws in the governance of Tunisia and 
Jordan. It describes the actors who depend on Islamic laws, or Sharia in Arabic language, to 
justify or oppose the demands for gender equality policies in the country.  
A recent study published by Moravian Geographical Reports has analysed the influence 
religiosity has on gender inequalities through exploratory quantitative analysis. The outcomes 
of the research show a correlation between high gender inequality in the political, social and 
economic spheres and high share of religiosity among the population of the country. It ranks 
Islam and Hinduism as the most influential ideologies in connection with high gender 
inequalities. Countries with the majority of inhabitants with no religious affiliation have the 
lowest gender inequalities, and countries with Christian and Buddhist societies have average 
levels of gender inequalities. (Klingorová and Havlíček, 2015). Some examples can be 
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illustrated on an empirical level, e.g. the ongoing mobilization of women in Poland to gain the 
right to decide about abortion against the Catholic Church’s appeals to ban abortion, as it is 
against religion and values (Pazderka, 2016). This is not as extreme as in Iran, where collective 
initiatives related to women’s rights are likened to criminal activities (Amnesty, 2016). 
Jordan and Tunisia have a high percentage of Sunni Muslims. Accordingly, we will further 
analyse the discourse on the implementation of Sharia laws in relation to: 1. Women’s rights 
movements’ efforts to constitutionalize gender equality in Jordan and Tunisia; and 2. Women’s 
rights movement’s mobilization to achieve gender equality in inheritance law in Tunisia. 
 
3.1 Women’s rights movements to constitutionalize gender equality in Jordan 
Islamic laws contain Sharia and Fiqh. Sharia laws are not reversible. They are based on 1. 
Quran and 2. Sunnah. Sunnah is the instructions from the life of prophet Mohammad, and 
Quran is the miracle of Islam – the word of God. Fiqh is reversible, as it is up to Islamic scholars 
to study and legislate it based on the current issues of their time (Ibrahim, 2012(. There are four 
main schools of thoughts to legislate Fiqh laws. Sunni schools of legalizing laws are each 
named after the scholar who taught them. The four primary Sunni schools are the Hanafi, 
Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali. The process of legislating Fiqh laws is called “Iftaa”, while 
“Fatwa” is the answer from the Islamic scholars who have the authority to conclude Fiqh laws 
regarding life matters, which vary from private to public sphere (Understanding Islam, n.d.).  
In Jordan, the department of Fatwa was established in 1921. At the beginning the job of the 
Islamic scholar “Al Mufti” was to answer questions from members of the public regarding 
matters like personal status, financial transactions or worship. There was a Mufti for each judge 
in each town. The judge consulted the mufti in matters that need an Islamic interpretation and 
the Mufti referred to the judge in matters that need legal supervision, for example in cases 
where witnesses were needed. The work flow was less institutionalized until 1941, when the 
King of Jordan appointed the first Mufti of the country. Later, there become the Ministry of 
Religious Endowments which the department of Iftaa become part of it. On 2006, the 
department of Iftaa became an independent institution where the Mufti is on the same 
recognition as minister in the country ("About the General Fatwa Department", n.d.). Thus, the 
institutionalization of religious affairs into state organizations approve the argument of 
Hirschkind (1997, 12–14). That the need to include Islam in the state is due to the expansion 
of the state into the social affairs. In 1921, Jordan was based on a tribal social system and eight 
separated governments which graduated into a centralized governance, to the independence of 
the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan in 1946 (Aruri, 1972, pp.24–27).  
33 
 
In Jordan the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs and Holy Sites (Jordan) is responsible for 
several tasks, e.g. Islamic preaching and mosques (About the Ministry – Ministry of Awqaf 
and Islamic Affairs, n.d.), while the “Al Iftaa” department is an independent institution 
responsible for constructing Islamic views on modern issues from public and personal spheres, 
e.g. Family Fiqh, which is family rules in Islamic jurisprudence (About the General Fatwa 
Department, n.d.). Thus, gender roles and the concept of gender equality in Jordon are officially 
connected to Islamic laws at the legislative and social levels. Alaa Khaled, is a Jordanian 
activist who, in an interview with the Christian science mentor, declared herself a Muslim who 
is seeking for gender equality while wearing her Islamic headscarf, and she does not see that 
as in contradiction to her Islamic identity (Khaled, 2018).  
On the other hand, Dr. Mohammad Noah, Minister of Islamic Affairs in Jordan in 2013 and 
2014, and Deputy Minister – International Parliament for Safety and Peace – New York from 
2015 until now, has described the relation between the husband and wife, saying that husbands 
need two things from their wives, while wives only need one. While the man needs respect and 
care, the woman needs only empathy. He described women as made from the rib of the man. 
He quoted prophet Mohammad that women were made from one rib of the man, he also said 
that this was why men had fewer ribs on one side than on the other. He goes further to explain 
that women are curly ribs, which means that men have to accept that no woman will fit to them, 
and, they shall accept this by having understanding and empathy toward them (Iqra TV 
channel, 2018). Dr. Mohamad Noah is also the son of the former grand Mufti of the country, 
Dr. Noah al Qudah, who passed away in 2010 (Ammon news, 2010).  
The department of Iftaa in Jordan states clearly in its website that only Islamic legal scholars 
are eligible to legislate through Islamic teachings ("About the General Fatwa Department", 
n.d.). Dr. Mohamad Noah is a legitimate Islamic scholar ("Prime Ministry - His Excellency Dr. 
Mohamed Noh Ali Al-Qudah", n.d.), while Alaa Khaled is an activist who claims that Islam is 
not contradictory to gender equality (Khaled, 2018).  
Blumer (1995, pp.60–83) has determined four stages for the life cycles of social movements. 
He describes the main element at the first stage of the development of the movement as the 
agitator. There are two types of agitation based on the situation. It can be either to trigger anger 
and spread awareness of an injustice condition that people are not aware of or when people are 
aware but they do not know what to do (Blumer, 1995, p.65). On 5th September 2014, the 
Facebook page “Feminists of Jordan” was established. The page spread awareness about 
inequalities which Jordanian women are facing. With the main Slogan “Ana Waleyet Amre” 
Which means I am the legal guardian of my own affairs ("Feminists of Jordan", 2018). The 
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main Slogan of this page is in contradictory to the personal status code in Jordan. Which is 
based on the Islamic laws and legislated through Sharia laws. On the official website of Iftaa 
department, the Jordanian Personal Status Law No. (36) for the year 2010 section (3), is named 
“the legal guardianship for getting married”. It states that women need an approval from legal 
guardian to approve their marriage. Unless the woman is divorced or has been married before. 
In the same law it indicates that two witnesses of women equal one witness of man. It also 
states that Muslim women cannot marry non-Muslims but Muslim men can if the women are 
from the monotheistic religions (Department of Ifta, 2010). 
The comments under the slogan “Ana Waleyet Amre” vary from supporting to objecting. There 
are controversial statements that might indicate the lack of understanding of the negative 
influence of legal guardianship on women. Sarah Abusinneh (2015, September 10) comments 
that it is something to admire if a girl can become the guardian of herself and if she can start 
taking decisions of herself. In response, Khalel Qaoud (2015, September 10) comments by 
praying to God to burn alive the woman who made this slogan. While Khaled Abd (2015, 
September 10) is wondering why raising this slogan, and whether this slogan aims to abolish 
the image of father in the family in order to destroy the image and values of society. In response, 
Serene Gharaibeh (2015, September 10) explains that this is not to abolish the role of parents. 
Because if parents have done a good job by raising up a strong independent educated girl then 
she shall not need the legal guardianship on her when she grows up to be an adult woman 
(Feminists of Jordan, 2015, September 10). Thus, the agitation is done in this first stage to 
spread awareness about discrimination against women and to collect supporters to the cause. 
Scholars have refined the names of these stages, yet the main patterns have stayed the same 
(Christiansen, 2009). The first stage is known as emergence, where collective actions are not 
taken. Yet, discontent is widely expressed and explained. And there is an increase of media 
coverage to the situation. 
The emergence stage can also appear through a social movement organization. The Jordanian 
women’s union was first established by Jordanian women activists in 1946. Lead by Emily 
Bisharat, a known Jordanian activist for fighting for Jordanian women suffrage. The union had 
its own ups and downs. They had to close due to marital laws and other restrictions from the 
government. It kept re-emerging until its existing now as an important union which is partnered 
with other Women’s Unions in other Arab country addressing gender-based inequalities. Thus, 
they are SMO which is united with other SMOs for a wider social movement (N. Zald and D. 
McCarthy, 1988). They have a vision for full equality between genders in all sections. Yet, as 
addressed by the vision of the union on their website, it says that their main objective is to 
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spread awareness about women’s rights and the importance of gender equality among the 
society. They state that women’s rights goal won’t be achieved without civil society. Therefore, 
their role is to spread awareness through workshops, press release and initiating polls. Thus, 
regarding the Blumer theory on the first cycle of social movements the members of the Union 
are the agitator to spread discontent among potential participants (Jordanian Women's Union, 
n.d.). 
“Feminists of Jordan” page, is branched with similar pages across the Arab countries. Like the 
uprising of Arab women in the Arab word supporting the aim of women independence and 
combating patriarchy (The uprising of women in the Arab world, 2011, October). C. Radsch 
has conducted a qualitative study with ethnography tools in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and 
Yemen. The author argues that women cyber activism gave women the chance to add a sexual 
and social revolutionary aspect to the Arab Spring to challenge patriarchy (C. Radsch, 2012). 
Yet, one might argue that “Feminists of Jordan” page is in the emergency stage of women’s 
rights movements. As complains were not transformed into wider organized collective actions.  
Nima Habashneh, is the founder of “my mother is Jordanian and her nationality is my right”. 
In cooperation with Arab young women and the progressive national trend, they have led a 
series of continues demonstrations front of the Jordanian parliament in 2011. They were asking 
to ratify article 6 in the Constitution by adding the word gender to the principle of equality 
between citizens (My Jordanian mother and her nationality are right for me, 2011; Amman net, 
2011). The demonstrations took place while the Jordanian parliament was reviewing the first 
amendments to the Jordanian Constitution after the Arab Spring. This step took the movement 
to the second stage which is the popular stage known as coalescence (Hopper 1950, p.273). 
SMOs like the Jordanian women’s union and sister hood is a global institute in Jordan have 
supported the cause. Yet, the demonstrations did not manage to reach the demand. In further 
steps, Jordanian activists including Amena Al Zubi the president of Jordanian women’s union 
have created “Human” civil society alliance in 2012. It included different civil society 
organizations, journalists and experts in the field of human rights. In 2018, the alliance has 
submitted recommendations to the Jordanian government including the recommendation to 
include the word gender in the Constitution. Ms. Amena al Zoubi has addressed that this 
alliance is self-initiated by Jordanian activists to document the civil society demands from the 
government (Human Alliance, 2018). One can argue, that by this step the women’s rights 
movement to constitutionalize gender has gone to the third stage of bureaucratization. Where 
1. The social movement was successful in raising awareness in a way that a coordinated staff 
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is needed 2. Expert staff are available and they have more access to political elite to address 
the demands formally and with more power (Macionis, 2001; Hopper, 1950). 
Yet, Ferguson (2017) has argued that leadership of women organization in Jordan is from the 
elite who are engaged for social status rather than mobilizing Jordanian women in reality. The 
author conducted a qualitative research, showing that women leaders of civil society 
organizations are coming from a certain elite which is tied to the government. They avoid 
threatening the government and its position. One might debunk the later argument by reviewing 
the official statement of the “Human alliance” where they stated clearly that the government 
has taken a centralized approach to its legislation and the alliance goal is to include the civil 
society in the process and to make pressure on the government to legislate all the 
recommendations from the civil society (Jordanian women’s Union, 2013).  
King Abdullah has appointed the royal committee to come up with the recommendations and 
to address it to the Jordanian parliament during the first Constitution amendments after the 
Arab Spring in 2011. As part of the political reforms (King Abdullah, 2011). In the official 
declaration by king Abdullah the appointed committee contained 10 members from men and 
there was no appointed women. The royal committee did not include the recommendation to 
add the word “sex” to article 6 about equality in the Constitution. The women’s rights 
movements did not manage to include their demand in the recommendations of the committee. 
But they managed to trigger different scholars and political actors to address their demand 
positively or negatively. Thus, they managed to bring their demand to the “access 
responsiveness” stage of the political of public policy making. (Schumaker, 1975, pp.494–5).  
Some of the arguments from the opposition to constitutionalize gender equality are based on 
the religious and traditional identity of the country. Mohammad al Khawaldeh, a Jordanian 
journalist, wrote an article as a letter addressed to the Jordanian parliament. The article states 
that they are facing a hard test, which they shall pass by declining the inclusion of gender 
equality in the Constitution. He argues that this amendment would further change the structure 
and the identity of the country, which is based on religion and tradition. He claims these 
demands are funded by the west to destroy the civilization of Jordan, using the international 
treaties as a tool for it (Al-Khawaldeh, 2011). An article on the official website of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan, states that equality between women and men cannot be applied, as God 
gave men and women specific natures that make them different. These arguments are supported 
by Islamic interpretations of “Hadeeth”, which is the statements transmitted from the prophet 
Mohammad. The authors condemn people demanding gender equality in the Muslim society, 
labelling this concept as an identity for the western modern societies. The authors claim that 
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western societies lack the main value of family, because women started to act and to be like 
men. The authors emphasize the role of men as sponsors for the family and the house. While 
women shall take care for husbands, house and children for a healthy nation (Muslim 
Brotherhood (Jordan), 2018). This might explain why based on the world bank statistics for 
labour participation, Jordanian women participate by 14% comparing to 64% to men (The 
World Bank, 2017). 
Dr. Dima Tahboub, from the Islamic front party has accused women’s rights movements who 
are asking to 1. ratify the international treaties as CEDAW to stop all kind of discrimination 
against women and who are asking for 2. full equality between women and men, as betrayers 
to the Jordanian society. She states that they are with western agendas and they want to destroy 
the concept of women as housekeepers (Tahboub 2017a, 2011b). Fawaz Al-Shahwan, director 
of Civil Status and Passports Department has responded to the demands of two Jordanian 
women’s rights advocates in an interview by stating “if God did not consider you as equal to 
men how you want our laws to consider you as equal?” (Deutsche Welle-Shabab Talk, 2017). 
These arguments might be legitimated by the identification of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan as a civil state backed by Islam. With the Constitution identifying the country as a 
Muslim Arab country (The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan). It is also 
backed with the personal status code which is structured from the Islamic teachings through 
“Dar al Iftaa” which we have illustrated above. 
The opposition to Jordanian women’s rights movements and associating them to international 
treaties referring to it as western agendas could be triggered by the post-colonial identity. 
Which addresses the effect that colonization left on the identity of the country. Jordan was 
under the British mandate until its dependence in 1946 ("Trans-Jordan", n.d.). Kumaraswamy 
(2006) described the national identity crises in the middle east as part of the post-colonial 
identity. The Islamic opposition is associating women’s rights movements as not part of the 
Jordanian national identity and they associate it to the west even though the women’s rights 
movements are identifying themselves as Arab Jordanian movements. The external support for 
women’s rights in Jordan resembled by CEDAW and other international treaties is making 
“militant’ leadership style where the “outsider” is considered as the “agitator”. Which confirms 
the theory by Schumaker that the “militant” leadership style causes opposition to the protest 
group by the other social groups (Schumaker 1975, p.17). 
 
3.2 Women’s rights movements to constitutionalize gender equality in Tunisia 
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After Tunisia’s independence from the French colonization, Habib Bourguiba the first Tunisian 
president dissolved the Islamic association for endowments and included it as part of the 
government (Tunisie, n.d.). In 1957, Habib Bourguiba has assigned the first Mufti of the 
republic. Before that, the Mufti’s job in Tunisia as in Jordan was part of the social norms and 
less institutionalized (Office of Ifta, n.d.). Bourguiba, has issued the magazine of personal 
status code. He abolished the law that used to give men the right to marry four women. 
Different Islamic scholars after the Arab Spring in Tunisia argued that polygamy for men is 
legalized by Sharia laws (Al Arab, 2015). The personal status code addressed full equality 
between women and men in matters of marriage and divorce (National portal of legal 
information, n.d.). At the time, a wide debate has been on the surface between scholars who 
viewed it as against Sharia laws and scholars who supported it as not against Islamic teachings 
and Sharia laws (Majala azeytouna, 2016, September 5; Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 2017). 
Bourguiba, has openly responded to Islamic scholars who opposed it or had comments on it. 
He sent the ones who opposed it to early retirement or asked them to resign (Ministry of cultural 
affairs, 2017). Some has addressed Bourguiba’s actions as a war announced on Islam. With his 
popular video taking off the traditional headscarf from the head of a Muslim woman, and his 
order to shut down the Zaytouna mosque one of the most influential Islamic institutions at the 
time (InfoTunisia2, 2011). While others have claimed that his efforts to create the Personnel 
status code magazine were sourced from and based on Islamic teachings (Al-Mahzabi, 2016).  
After many years and the change of two regimes in Tunisia, a similar debate between the 
Islamic identity of the country and the legal status of women’s rights and gender roles is still 
on the surface in the Tunisian society (Association of imams for moderation and rejection of 
extremism, 2017). The Arab Spring has provided the chance in Tunisia to make the new 
Constitution based on popular participation. This is through an elected Constitution assembly. 
After the fall of ben Ali regime, the National Constituent Assembly was elected with its 217 
members to channel the voices of Tunisian people in the making of the new Constitution (The 
Carter Center, 2014).  
De Silva de Alwis and Mnasri (2017) addressed how women in the NCA have agreed that the 
new Constitution shall assure women’s rights. Yet, their views about the concept of women’s 
rights and what kind of role women shall be playing in the society varied. The interventions 
varied between two main political discourses by the two main political parties: 1. Nida Tunis 
the secularist party which is feared by al Nahda party of being in favour to the previous 
authoritarian regime and 2. Al Nahda Islamic party which is accused by Nida Tunis of not 
being modernized and pro women’s rights as it claims to be. On an empirical level when 
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women’s rights movements were lobbying for gender equality article in the new Constitution 
their opposition got their arguments from the Islamic laws. The argument was also sourced 
from the fact that Tunisia is a Muslim country therefore it shall be gender complementary roles 
according to Islamic laws instead of gender equality. In the draft making of the Constitution 
the subcommittee has voted 12 to 8 to this article “The State guarantees the protection of 
women's rights and support of its [their] achievements as a real partner of man in building the 
nation. Their roles within the family are complementary” (Carter Center, 2014; Dahlerup, 
Danielsson and Johansson, 2012).  
Based on the report by Carter Center, The NCA had transparency to media during their meeting 
to discuss the drafting of the Constitution. There was limitation on access for public and Civil 
Society actors who wanted to attend the plenary sessions. Yet, Civil society organizations like 
“Bawsala” has managed to enter the planetary discussions and to update the public about the 
ongoing discussions through social media. However, the public had the chance to view the 
debate live through TV broadcasting (The Carter Center 2014, pp.61–65). Thus, the live 
coverage might have contributed in the fast response and mobilization of women’s rights 
movements who went out in the streets in the “coalescence stage” taking an action to prevent 
the amendment of “gender complimentary” instead of “gender equality” in the new Tunisian 
Constitution. At the beginning of August 2012, the ruling coalition of al Nahda party at the 
time has presented a proposed law of gender complementary in the Constitution which was 
accepted by the subcommittee on rights and freedoms (The carter centre, 2014, pp.84–86). 
Discontent among opponents has emerged making the first life cycle of social movements” 
emergence”.  
On 14 August 2012, the first collective actions were taken by thousands of protestors in 
different Tunisian cities asking for full equality between women and men (Marks, 2012). Many 
women who went out in the streets are from the Trade Union Movement, civic bodies, les 
femmes’ democrats and other civil and political organizations (Tamaru, O’Reilly, and 
Holtivrty, 2018). This assured the third stage of bureaucratization, as staff and members in 
these SMOs continued their participation in the work of the NCA to assure gender equality. 
Les femmes democrats and other civil society representatives have created the project “The 
Constitution of Citizenship and Equality through the Eyes of Women" in order to present it to 
the NCA (Association of Democratic Women, 2012). 
At first glance, one can argue that the women’s rights movement to constitutionalize gender 
equality has declined by success in 2014. When the NCA has adapted article 26 which refers 
to gender equality (Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, 2014). Decline can be by success usually 
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when the social movement is with a small specific goal (Miller, 1999, pp.303–324). Yet, 
considering that there are different laws which are still opposing gender equality in the 
Constitution like the inheritance law (Human Rights Watch, 2018) one might argue that the 
decline of this women’s rights movement would be by “the establishment within the 
mainstream”. Thus, not only by constitutionalizing gender equality as a primary goal. 
Establishment within the mainstream is achieved when the social movement manages to 
include its narratives in the wider political and social context (Macionis, 2001).  
 
3.3 Women’s rights movements for equal inheritance in Tunisia:  
President Beji Caid Essebsi created the commission for Individual Freedoms and Equality on 
13 August 2017, National Women’s Day, and tasked it with providing recommendations for 
amending laws in Tunisia (The Tunisian Commission of Individual Freedoms and Gender 
Equality, 2017). The commission has created a report with a list of recommendations to amend 
laws that do not comply with Human Rights. The recommendations include amending the 
inheritance law. A list of 93 civil society organizations in Tunisia have signed and supported 
the report (The commission for Individual Freedoms and Equality, 2018). Yet, the call for 
gender equality in inheritance law opened a wide debate among different groups in the Tunisian 
society. The inheritance law is seen by some as an important element of Islam and the Tunisian 
Muslim identity. Which is identified by the first article of the Constitution. While others 
perceive such a law as in contradictory to the civil state concept and the gender equality article 
in the Tunisian Constitution (Sherlock, 2017). 
The Islamic higher assembly condemned the recommendations in the report by the commission 
for personal freedoms and equality. Which contained a recommendation to change the 
inheritance law in Tunisia for gender equality. the Islamic higher assembly has made a 
declaration that this report is against Sharia laws. It demanded to edit the report with the 
presence of an Islamic committee to change the recommendations in a way that fits to the 
Islamic and Arabic identity of Tunisia (The Islamic higher assembly, 2018). The National 
Coordination for the Defence of the Quran, the Constitution and Fair Development, which was 
established in 2017, is currently running an intensive lobbying campaign. They are accusing 
the later recommendations and the report by the committee for personal freedoms and equality 
to be against the Arabic and Islamic identity of Tunisia (The National Coordination for the 
Defence of the Quran, the Constitution and Fair Development, 2018).  
On one hand, Said Sami Brahem, an expert on Islamic culture, has argued that regarding the 
inclusion of gender equality in the Constitution, Al Nahda party has finally accepted it to look 
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like a modern movement, but in reality it had no choice but to listen to the civil society. The 
sociologist Tarek Belhadj Mohamed stated that al Nahda party had to make concessions after 
being confronted by Tunisian women and social groups (Mohamed and Brahem, 2014). On the 
other hand, al Nahda party has celebrated the victory that their candidate Souad Abderrahim, 
has been elected as the first female mayor in the country (Middle east eye, 2018). Rachid al 
Ghannouchi, the president of al Nahda party has claimed that the party is in favour of 
democracy and women’s rights (Ghannouchi, 2012). On the empirical level, Souad 
Abderrahim, the first female mayor and a Nahda party member, has been criticized for her 
statements about freedom. She stated that freedom shall be limited by traditions and costumes. 
She gave an example of women who have children from illegal marriage. She described them 
of being a plague on the Tunisian society and they shall receive no rights (Mahjar-Barducci, 
2011). On 26 August 2018, Al Nahda party has given its official rejection toward the 
presidential initiative to legalize equal inheritance law between women and men (HRW, 2018). 
Despite the ongoing large women’s rights mobilization with a slogan “equal inheritance is a 
right not a privilege” (Tunisian Alliance for Equality in Inheritance, 2018). Therefore, one 
might argue that the claims from the opposition of Al Nahda party are correct. Because they 
accepted primary the constitutionalization of gender equality yet in their discourse and actions 
they won’t confirm legislating gender equality laws like the equal inheritance law.  
According to an executive director of a nongovernmental organization that works on women 
empowerment projects in Tunisia, political Islam is a delicate yet possible combination. She 
speculates that Islam has given women many rights. Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
demands for equal inheritance rights between genders, she notes that many people supported 
this demand while many others opposed it. She describes the difference between the two 
approaches that some wants gender equality in global way while others interpret it from Quran, 
and in Quran they say there is a verse that says inheritance shall not be equal between genders. 
One youth worker has objected on the term of political Islam. Because Islam is a religion and 
there shall be a separation between religion and governance. In contrary a teacher and youth 
worker, has addressed political Islam represented by Nahda party in Tunisia as an advanced 
narrative which is in support of the rights of Tunisian women. Yet, he maintains that women 
and men shall not be equal in inheritance. Because in some cases woman inherit more than men 
based on Islamic laws. He asserts that opposition to this law is focusing only on the cases where 
men inherit more than women and they ignore the cases where women are inheriting more than 
men according to Sharia laws (Interview in person, May 2018, appendix A). 
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The later argument regarding justice in inheritance for women instead of equality based on 
Sharia laws is also expressed by different Islamic scholars in Tunisia and different Muslim 
countries. At the scientific Islamic plenary discussion held by Zaytouna university in Tunisia, 
the scholars asserted that the inheritance are not divided mainly based on gender. It is divided 
on three strands: 1. The degree of family relation, close relatives inherit more than far ones. 2. 
The age of the receivers of inheritance, younger people receive more inheritance than older 
ones 3. And finally, by the amount of financial obligations. In the third strand men receive 
more inheritance than women. For example, daughters have less inheritance than their brothers 
when parents pass away. The reason for this, is sons in the future are expected to open a house 
and pay “Mahr” which is an amount of money for their future wives. Because men are expected 
to finance their future wives and family. Thus, they shall receive more inheritance. An 
emphasis is also on sons as guardians and supporters for their sisters. They are expected to 
continue supporting their family after the father pass away. Thus, they shall receive more 
inheritance. In view of the later interpretation, the Islamic scholars at the plenary discussion 
argue that women are upraised as they are excused from the financial obligations (Scholars and 
Sheikhs of Zaytouna, 2017).  
In response to the later Islamic opposition, women right’s movements have established the 
coalition of equal inheritance as non-governmental organization (The national coalition for 
equal inheritance, 2018). With the creation of the coalition they have taken the action that took 
the movement from the coalescence stage to bureaucratization. In this stage a trained staff is 
organizing and moderating the further steps with possible access to political elites (Macionis, 
2001; Hopper, 1950). In an interview, Hala ben Salem, member at the coalition for equal 
inheritance and member in the executive committee at the Tunisia association of the democratic 
women has addressed the main slogan of the upcoming demonstrations “Equality in inheritance 
is a right not a privilege”. Ben Salem addressed that this slogan goes in line with the 
presentations presented by the Tunisian association of democratic women front of the 
committee for individual rights. Thus, an expert staff with organizational structure is mobilized 
to combat the opposition and to have access to the political elite. Regarding the opposition, 
Ben Salem states that next of the religious arguments there is also cultural and financial 
arguments. Yet, she addresses that these arguments are not valid anymore as women are 
working and participating equally in the finance of the household (Ben Salem, 2018).  
As a solution to gender discriminatory policies, international conventions on women’s rights 
are perceived as an assist and an important tool to support women’s rights on a national level. 
The CEDAW treatment assures laws based on gender equality such as gender equality in 
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inheritance (General Assembly resolution, United Nations Human Rights Office of the Higher 
Commission, n.d.). Women’s rights advocates in Tunisia who demand full gender equality in 
all aspects are accused by some of their opposition of being westernized and “western-
inspired”. The opposition referred to the report by the Tunisian commission for individual 
liberties and equality as “The French report” (Ridha Jaouadi, 2018, September 27; Abu Yarub 
al-Marzouqi, 2018). France colonized Tunisia till its dependence in 1956 (History world, 
2001). The opposition to CEDAW in Tunisia has claimed that the treaty is unsuitable to the 
Arabic and Islamic culture and the identity of Tunisia (Al Saeedany, 2013). This opposition 
might also be studied through the post-colonial identity which describes the effect of former 
colonization on the current identity of the country. Kumaraswamy (2006) has associated the 
national identity crises in the middle east to the postcolonial identity. Accusing Tunisian 
women’s rights movements of being westernized despite their self-identification as Tunisians 
could be triggered by the identity crises. One might argue that CEDAW support to women’s 
rights movement in Tunisia has added a “militant’ leadership style. Where the “outsider” is 
considered as the “agitator”. Which confirms the theory by Schumaker that the “militant” 
leadership style causes opposition to the protest group from the other social groups (Schumaker 
1975, p.17). 
In 2014, Tunisia became the first Arab country to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Yet, the government declared that it 
will not legislate any laws or policies which violate the first article in the Constitution. The first 
article refers to Islam as the religion of the country (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In the official 
rejection of al Nahda party to the equal inheritance law they stated that this law is against Sharia 
laws and they will not accept legalizing laws which are contradictory to Quran and Sharia 
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). Therefore, this rejection and the Islamic identity of the country 
impose further questions: To which extent international treaties can be helpful for women’s 
rights movements in countries which are identified as Muslim Arab countries? And whether 
imposing such treaties will cause more accusations to women’s rights movements of being 
westernized, thus getting rejected from different social groups?  
Yet, despite the Islamic opposition to women’s rights movement in Tunisia, Tunisian women 
have gained many rights through the reforms of gender discriminatory laws. These reforms 
have been led by the al Nida secularist party, e.g. abolishing the law that forbid women from 
marrying non-Muslim men (President Beji Caid Essebsi, 2017). Thus, this goes in line with the 
findings of Melo (2016), who asserted that the radical transition in Portugal led by left parties 
has helped women’s rights movements to succeed with their demand for gender equality public 
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policies. This success in Portugal was faster than in Spain, where the right-wing party was in 
government. 
  
3.3 Comparative conclusion between Jordan and Tunisia  
In Jordan and Tunisia, the Islamic narratives are compatible with women’s rights. Islamic 
actors who are involved in politics and decision making have confirmed their support to 
women’s rights. But narratives change when it comes to the concept of gender equality. In 
Tunisia and in Jordan, women’s rights movements who asked to add gender equality in the 
Constitution faced an opposition. The opposition in both countries used Sharia laws to justify 
their arguments. In Tunisia, women’s rights movements have managed to constitutionalize 
gender equality and to combat the narratives of their opposition. Some Islamic political actors 
in Tunisia have finally supported the constitutionalization of gender equality. Yet, when 
women’s rights movements asked for equal inheritance, the Islamic opposition represented by 
al Nahda party has officially rejected it. This is similar to the situation in Indonesia which we 
have reviewed in the literature review (Ghazali et al, 2016).  
Ghazali et al stated that some gender equality policies are facing religious opposition in 
Indonesia. The authors have suggested a cooperation between feminists and Islamic leaders 
(Ghazali et al, 2016). This is similar to the recommendation of Dr. El Masri. El Masri, 
recommended Tunisian feminists to get acknowledged with Quran verses to combat the Islamic 
opposition (El Masri, 2015). Yet, on an empirical level, the Islamic narratives are not flexible 
toward certain laws like inheritance law in Tunisia. Because it is part of Sharia laws. Islamic 
scholars have addressed that Sharia laws are not able to be reversed or edited. Thus, we argue 
that justifying women’s rights narratives and its mobilization based on religious laws are not 
compatible with the women’s rights mobilization for full gender equality in all sectors. Our 
argument is based on the example from the mobilization for equal inheritance law in Tunisia 
and the mobilization to constitutionalize gender equality in Jordan. We predict, that a similar 
pattern might appear in Jordan. Even, with the constitutionalization of gender equality in the 
country, some laws which are in contradiction with “Sharia irreversible laws” won’t be possible 
to change. Because Islam is identified as an element of the political structure. Our argument 
goes in line with the findings of Mojab in Iran. Mojab, argued that justifying women’s rights 
through the Islamic narratives create a patriarchal system which cannot be fixed (Mojab, 2001).  
Yet, from the reviewed narrative we argue that if Islam is perceived by its beholders as a 
religion, then contradictory debates about gender equality policies at the legislative level could 
be eliminated. We suggest that a cooperation between women’s rights movements and religious 
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leaders is fruitful if it is to promote secularization while preserving religion for personal piety 
and freedom of thought. We argue that women’s rights movements in Tunisia, have managed 
to constitutionalize gender equality because of its history of imposing secularism from a top-
down approach and due to the fact that the democratic transition after the Arab Spring is led 
by al Nida secularist party. Yet, when women’s rights advocates asked for equality in 
inheritance law the controversial debate between the Islamic identity of the country and the 
concept of gender equality has appeared again as an obstacle. 
Another example about the controversial debate between the Islamic identity and the concept 
of gender equality comes from Souad Abderrahim. She is the first female mayor in Tunisia and 
she is representing Al Nahda Islamic party. Despite, presenting herself as an example of women 
empowerment she has condemned women who have children out of marriage and she described 
them as a plague on Tunisian society. She legitimated her argument through the Islamic laws 
(Abderrahim, 2011). on the other hand, Bushra bel haj, representative of Nida secularist party 
and president of the commission for individual rights and equality defended full equality in all 
sectors including women’ rights to register their children on their names (Bushra bel haj, 2018). 
In Jordan, political Islamic parties like the Islamic front party and Muslim brothers are claiming 
to be pro women’s rights. But when it comes to gender equality, narratives in Jordan are more 
conservative comparing to the narratives in Tunisia. This might be explained by the history of 
secularization from top-down approach in Tunisia. For example, polygamy for men, which is 
sourced from Sharia laws, was forbidden in Tunisia in 1956. This abolishment was from top-
down approach. As we have illustrated the first president of Tunisia responded to the Islamic 
opposition by repression. In Jordan, polygamy for men and other discriminatory laws against 
women are integrated into the personal status code. Muslim women in Jordan cannot marry 
non-Muslim men but men can marry non-Muslim women. This law was abolished in Tunisia 
after the Arab Spring also from a top down approach. Through a led initiative by president 
Essebsi representing al Nida secularist party (President Beji Caid Essebsi, 2017).  
In Tunisia, the democratic transition was from bottom-up approach. The NCA to draft the 
Constitution was elected. Gender parity was assured. The negotiations over drafting the 
Constitution was transparent (The Carter centre, 2014). In Jordan, the committee to propose 
amendment to the Constitution was appointed by the king. There were no women in the 
appointed committee. Thus, one might conclude that democratization from bottom-up 
approach have provided better opportunities for women’s rights movements to be informed 
and included in Tunisia. While in Jordan the lack of transparency and the Lancaster model have 
weakened women’s rights movements and did not manage to encounter their opposition to 
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include gender equality in the Constitution. The later process in Jordan might confirm the 
findings of Ferguson, that the political liberation strategy used by the regime in Jordan has 
created a culture of fear which caused failure in leadership across women’s rights movements 


































4 State Feminism and Co-optation of Women Social Movements  
 
Badran (2009, p.223) defined state feminism as the situation where governments are approving 
or creating feminist projects. The state might also forbid other feminist projects that comes 
from non-governmental actors and does not go in line with its policies. In another terms or 
view state feminism can be also when the feminist movements are acting in line with the 
political stream of the ruling party rather than opposing to it (Hershatter, 2007, p.102). It can 
also be seen as a positive outcome based on the strategic opportunities provided in the 
democratic transition and to which extent WSMs have exploited them within the democratic 
transition (Franceschet and Okeke-Ihejirika, 2002). While in other cases governments can use 
feminism and women’s rights to cover up their other harmful policies such as austerity. 
Therefore, state feminism could be associated to co-optation (Allsopp, 2012). Co-optation is a 
term with a variety of meanings, in this research co-optation refers to the inclusion of strategic 
actors or group of actors from women’s rights movements in the governmental sector by the 
state in a way that makes these leaders shift from the main aims and core values of WSMs. 
These strategic actors can be within or out the political elite (Gerschewski, 2013). 
 
4.1 The influence of state feminism on women’s rights movement in Jordan  
The 2018 report by Freedom House classified Jordan as partly free. Rating the freedom of press 
as not free, civil and political rights as partly free. Josua (2011) suggests that authoritarian 
regimes would rather to maintain its base and assuring its continuity by co-opting its political 
elites rather than co-opting new actors. Because losing its base is riskier than losing the chance 
to get new supporters. Schumaker (1975) addressed how political officials and agency officials 
are an intervening variable that can influence the success or failure of social movements in 
achieving “Policy responsiveness”. These two hypotheses may explain why the efforts of 
Jordanian women’s rights movements did not manage till now to abolish the law that does not 
give women the right to pass their nationality for their children. Thus, it did not decline by 
success. Decline of social movements is known by scholars as the last stage of the life cycle of 
social movements which might end by a variety of ways including success or failure (Miller, 
1999).  
Jordanian citizenship laws do not perceive women and men as equal. Women who are married 
to foreigner men are not allowed to pass their nationality for their children. This is not the case 
for Jordanian men (Law No. 6 art.9 of 1954 on Nationality). The citizenship laws in Jordan 
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like in different Arab countries perceive citizenship as a right which is transmitted by blood 
through a male citizen (The United Nations High Commissioner, 2014). Jordanian women and 
their families are demanding for years now to abolish the gender discriminatory law regarding 
the citizenship. 
 Nima Habashneh, is married to Moroccan national. She could not pass her nationality to her 
children and husband. Thus, she states that on 2009 she decided to open the Facebook page 
“My mother is Jordanian and her citizenship is my right” (Mar’ie, 2015; Sweis, 2015). 
Habashneh, described how the Arab Spring, has brought the opportunity for this movement to 
move out to streets demonstrations. In 2011, as part of the political reform the Jordanian 
government has withdrawn the law that does not allow public gathering without permission 
(World report Jordan, 2015).  
Nima Habashneh, the founder of this campaign has started to express her discontent with this 
discriminatory law online (Mom Jordanian, 2009, June 29), this is where the “emergence” stage 
appeared. After she opened the first Facebook page “My mother is Jordanian and her 
citizenship is my right”. The “popular stage” or the “Coalescence stage” was in formation 
where people in the campaign got to know each other and strategies with leadership started to 
be formed online. To take the first collective action as a demonstration in the street in 2011. 
Yet, the movement requires to move to the bureaucratization stage which scholars indicated 
that it is important for the success and to maintain the movement. Because it contains experts 
who would assure the continuity of the movement rather than volunteers (Macionis, 2001; 
Hopper, 1950). The Minister of interior affairs, Hussein al Majali, has announced that there is 
around 84, 711 Jordanian women who are married to non-Jordanians (Minister of Interior 
Hussein Majali, 2014). Thus, the number of people who are affected by this law might explain 
the continuity of the movement (My Mother is Jordanian and her nationality is my right, 2018 
September 23).  
In 2013, 11 civil society organizations and different women’s rights advocates have launched 
the coalition “my nationality is the right of my family” and by this taking the movement to the 
bureaucratization stage. From the first sight, this slogan is not triggering directly the principle 
of equality between men and women. It is associating the right of children to get their mother 
nationality rather than asking directly for equality between women and men. Yet, main 
speakers from the coalition have highlighted that this is a step toward complete gender equality 
policies. The priorities set by the coalition was declared by its founders as first to include 
gender equality in the Constitution then to abolish the nationality discriminatory law (‘My 
nationality is right for my family’, 2013). 
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Dababneh (2005) has argued that women’s movements in Jordan fit to the resource’s 
mobilization theory were middle class influential women took actions and used their positions 
to improve the situation of Jordanian women. On the contrary, Ferguson (2017) conducted a 
qualitative study through focus groups and interviews to find reasons for the failure of women 
leadership in Jordan. He concludes that female leaders are in strong ties rather than opposing 
the government. He highlighted this factor as one of the reasons for the failure of women 
leadership. In the case of Jordanian nationality law, the spokesperson of the coalition to reform 
the nationality law is Oroub Sobuh. Sobuh, is an independent human rights advocate and 
Jordanian media person. In a talk show, Oroub Sobuh and her colleague the lawyer Hala Adel 
have been accused by Mahmoud Kharabshah a former Jordanian parliament member of 
working against the country (Deutsche Welle-Shabab Talk, 2017). Yet, when it comes to 
female leadership on a national level, the national commission for women in Jordan was 
established by Princess Basma Bent Talal, the sister of the King and part of the royal family. 
Further, Queen Rania, the wife of King Abdullah is represented as “a progressive Arab women 
voice” (Biography.com Editors, 2014). While women and men in Jordan can be imprisoned for 
criticizing the royal family according to the restrictions on freedom of speech (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017). As described by the website of the national commission for women, among their 
tasks is to build the capacities of candidate women for political representation and to promote 
the national agenda for women issues (The Jordanian National Commission for Women 
(JNCW), n.d.). Thus, one might argue that this is a technique of co-optation of female leaders 
to address the policies of the authoritarian regime.  
In 2014, the Jordanian government have issued ID cards to assure some basic rights to 
undocumented children and husbands of Jordanian women (Human Rights Watch, 2016). After 
five years of the launch of the coalition, the main narratives are focused now on the recognition 
of the ID cards and the implementation of the policies that assure free education and free basic 
rights like health insurance to children and men who obtained these cards (My mother is 
Jordanian and her nationality is my right, 2018 September 23; My nationality is a right for my 
family, 2018 September 12). Different people who received these documents reported that the 
benefits are not provided in practice (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Deutsche Welle-Shabab 
Talk, 2017). This shift in the narratives from equal right in nationality to only rights for 
undocumented children and husbands might be explained by the recent cooperation which was 
launched between the coalition and the Jordanian national commission for women. The 
Jordanian national commission for women is a semi-governmental organization established by 
Princess Basma bent Talal as we have illustrated above (The Jordanian National Commission 
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for Women (JNCW), n.d.). In April 2018, a coalition called “Right” was officially launched 
between the commission and the coalition “My nationality is the right for my family” and 
different national campaigns for women’s rights (Jordanian National Commission for Women, 
2018). According to the current political situation in Jordan and the theories of co-optation one 
might predict that the co-optation might lead to the failure of the grass root movement to gain 
equality in nationality law by shifting the demands from equality in nationality law to rights 
and access to facilities for the children and the husbands of Jordanian women.  
In 2012, the Jordanian government has increased women quota in the parliament from 12 to 15 
(International Institute for Democracy and electoral assistance, 2018). While in the same year 
as reported by freedom house, the Jordanian government has amended the press and publication 
law to impose more restrictions on online media. Gheytanchi and N. Moghadam (2014) have 
conducted a study where they analysed the importance of women cyber activism in different 
middle eastern countries, addressing the importance of women’s cyber activism in the social 
change. Nima Habashneh, the founder of the first campaign for equality in nationality law has 
described the start of her activism. She states that it was exciting for her to receive a lot of 
support from different women through her Facebook page. But as she organized the first 
demonstration she was disappointed that women who were active with her on Facebook did 
not join the demonstration. She states that some of them had closed their phones and others 
have answered and said that their husbands did not allow them to join. Thus, regarding the 
socio-political context in Jordan, one might argue that despite the government initiative to 
increase the quota for women the restrictions it proposed on online media is firstly and mainly 
harming women. Nima Habashneh, has passed away due to heart attack in 2015 (F. Sweis 
2015; Habashneh, 2013) 
In June 2018, wide demonstrations took place in Jordan demanding the abolishment of austerity 
imposed by the international monetary fund and to combat corruption. In response the king of 
Jordan has appointed Omar al Razaz who is known as a liberal political actor. Omar al Razaz 
has assigned 7 female ministers including a female spokesperson for the first time in the 
country (Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2018). Yet, 
in response to the question about equality between genders in nationality law, he confirmed 
that the government will assure rights for undocumented children and husbands without 
referring to gender equality in nationality law (Parliament of Jordan, 2018). Further, some 
lawmakers who identified themselves as pro gender equality and women’s rights they are 
against abolishing this discriminatory policy for political reasons. Mr. Nabel Geishan, Member 
at the Jordanian parliament who described himself in an interview as at the forefront of 
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Jordanian feminism and an advocate for gender equality is pro the discriminatory nationality 
law. He has justified his position as “I am all for women’s rights and equality, but the 
naturalization of Jordanian women is a political issue, not a humanitarian one” (Geishan, 2017). 
The core values of feminism are “co-opted for political reasons.  
We argue that in an authoritarian regime, where one of the biggest women institutions is 
oriented and established within the regime, and where the prime minister is assigned by the 
king, women’s grass-root movement are hindered to receive support from the parliament and 
other political actors. This is due to the monarchy co-optation strategy to co-opt its own 
political elite.  
 
4.2 The influence of state feminism on women’s rights movement in Tunisia  
Women in Tunisia from their various backgrounds were united during the “Arab Spring” 
asking for the fall of the previous dictator regime of Ben Ali (Khalil, 2014). Dr, Al Masri (2015) 
addresses how the previous dictator regimes of Ben Ali and Bourguiba have co-opted feminists 
in Tunisia and used them as a political tool in bargaining with their Islamic opposition. She 
argues that despite the privilege women got under the previous dictator regimes they joined the 
uprisings of the “Arab Spring” for their freedom of expression and due to the economic reasons 
because women suffered as men from corruption and nepotism.  
Different scholars have addressed how the former regime of Ben Ali had long history of using 
state-sponsored feminism while oppressing and torturing female political activists (Gall, 2015; 
Murphy, 2003). Yet, one cannot ignore the rights Tunisian women gained with the “state 
feminism” of Bourguiba and Ben Ali comparing to their peers in the other “Arab Countries” 
("Bourguiba and Ben Ali", 2013). Scholars addressed how despite these privileges, women 
were not able to enjoy freedom of speech. The co-optation was among the base of the regime 
which created selective feminism and increased the gap between women from different areas 
in the Tunisian society (Murphy, 2003; El Masri 2015). Rivetti (2015) has addressed how the 
fall of the former regime does not mean that the new regime is entirely new or the older regime 
is totally over. This theoretical interconnection between the old and the new regime might 
justify the question imposed by Dr el Masri (2015) whether Tunisian feminists are going further 
to autonomy or back to co-optation after the Arab Spring?  
In the President speech at the national day for women on 13, August 2017, president Essebsi 
asked for full equality between women and men and he presented the equality in inheritance 
law as a necessity for the country (Présidence Tunisie, 2017, August 13). This speech and 
initiative came at the same time as the harsh socio-economic conditions which pushed some 
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activists and other political parties to consider it as misleading. A tool to gain political support 
for the upcoming electoral campaigns on the cost of the socio-economic conditions of the 
country (Ghanmi, 2017). Jialni Hamami, leader at the Popular front, argues that the speech of 
the president is as an attempt to co-opt women voices for his next elections and to use them as 
a tool to pressure Al Nahda Islamic party. He also exposed it as an attempt from the President 
to cover up the anti-corruption campaign led by Al Shahed, the Tunisian Prime Minister. He 
claims that, president Essebsi tried in several occasions to interfere in order to make the anti-
corruption campaign fail (Hamami, 2017).  
At the youth forum in Tunisia, in May 2018, we have asked the following question to different 
Tunisian activists from various backgrounds “How the recent call of president Essebsi for equal 
inheritance influence women’s rights mobilization in Tunisia? Their answers varied. An 
activist at the youth forum which is under the support of the ministry of youth and sport: Said 
“What concerns me in this call that it did not come due to a social mobilization and it did not 
come from the Tunisian street. We did not hear about this issue before president al Essebsi has 
called for it. We as a civil society in Tunisia perceive it as an external order. It did not come 
during the right context and time. It comes during a time where Tunisia is witnessing challenges 
with terrorism and economic challenges. This call brought a controversial debates and 
disagreements which were not necessary. If we like it or not the Tunisian society has a religious 
background and the strength of this background varies from south to north. The needs of the 
Tunisian citizen now are economic empowerment and dignity so this call did not come during 
the right time. Women and men are side by side in Tunisia. Tunisia’s main challenges now is 
unemployment, high prices and economic challenges. We are still practicing democracy and it 
needs a long path to practice. Therefore, the problem with this call that it did not come at the 
right time”. An executive director of adventures for development association to integrate 
different social groups in the society through sports with special focus on women: said “There 
were many people who opposed it and many people who welcomed it and congratulated him 
for taking such a courageous movement.” One teacher and youth worker, working with 
alternative media and youth associations: said “The demands for equality in inheritance were 
made for media buzz where women are presented in media as a political tool rather than 
representing the real issues of Tunisian women. Like working in laws to prevent rape and 
violence committed on women. Or the needed laws to support single mothers and women who 
face poverty.  
In conclusion, the interviewed activists have addressed concerns about the call for equal 
inheritance from president Essebsi. If this initiative is for the benefits of Tunisian women or 
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for a political tool. The participants have brought similar concerns which was brought up 
previously by scholars who analysed state feminism under the former two dictator regimes. As 
addressed by Dr. El Masri, the former regime has used women’s rights movements for 1. 
Pleasing the international community 2. As bragging tool with the Islamic opposition and 3. 
To cover up corruption and nepotism. This is while oppressing female political activists who 
are not in favour for the regime (Dr. El Masri, 2015). The state feminism in Tunisia represented 
by the secular party, Nida Tunis and its president Essebsi has assisted women’s rights 
movement after the Arab Spring by different legal reforms. Like abolishing the law that forbid 
Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims. Yet, their support for the equal inheritance law 
is perceived by different social and political actors as a possible tool for co-optation and thus 
they are showing concerns to join or support the initiative based on the illustrated views and 
comments above.  
The social movement “Manich Msameh” which means “I do not forgive” has been launched 
to stop the legalisation of the reconciliation law. The reconciliation law was proposed by 
president Essebsi. The law free former actors from the previous regime from corruption 
accusations and charges. In response to the claims that president Essebsi has abolished 
discriminatory laws against women to hide corruption, the movement has been joined by 
various feminists with the slogan: Anti-Corruption is a feminist narrative. Stating that sexism 
is not the only problem women face in Tunisia. Different Feminists like “Aswat al Nisa” group 
have joined the campaign. Ikram ben Said, co-founder of “Aswat al Nisa” has indicated that 
intersectional feminism will unite Tunisian women from their various backgrounds (Grhibi, 
2017; Ben said, 2017). The Tunisian coalition for equal inheritance has organized a 
demonstration where participants carried the slogan “equality in inheritance is a right not a 
privilege”. The coalition has been established by 64 NGOs and different women’s rights 
advocates. The president of the Tunisian Observatory for Economic and Social Rights Massoud 
Ramadani is a member in coalition. In an interview he states that women from rural areas are 
beneficiaries from equal inheritance (Ramadani, 2018). The later argument goes in line with 
intersectional feminism proposed by the association “Aswat al Nisa”. It also responds to the 
concerns that to achieve equality in inheritance does not respond to the current Tunisian 
economic crises. Jialni Hamami, leader at the Popular front has firstly expressed concerns 
regarding the call of president Essebsi for equal inheritance. In a recent interview in response 
to the women’s rights mobilization he expressed his support to the women’s rights movements 
seeking for equal inheritance. He stated that gender equality shall be applied in all aspects 
(Hamami, 2018). Thus, with more intersectional feminists’ narratives, we predict that women’s 
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rights movements can gain more support. By combating the old image of state feminism and 
co-optation of women’s rights to cover up corruption and nepotism. Yet, we predict that a wider 
intersectional feminist mobilization is still needed to achieve this goal.  
 
4.3 Comparative conclusion between Jordan and Tunisia  
State feminism represented by al Nida secularist party in Tunisia has helped women’s rights 
movement after the Arab Spring to bring the topic of equality in inheritance in the “access 
responsiveness” and “Agenda sitting”. The radical transition addressed by Melo (2016) in 
Portugal is similar to state feminism in Tunisia. Where the government led by secularist party 
has managed to legalise gender equality policies. President Essebsi representing Nida Tunis, 
has abolished the law which forbidden Tunisian women from marrying non-Muslims which is 
sourced from Sharia laws (Islam way, 2012). Yet, the law for equal inheritance is still in the 
agenda sitting and women’s rights movement needs a wider support from different social 
groups to pressure the parliament members to legislate it. 
This is different from Jordan, where state feminism has helped women to gain more positions 
in political representation. Yet, it has neglected women’s grass root movements demands to 
achieve equality in the nationality law. The King has the power to assign and dismiss the prime 
ministers and their governments. The new prime minster has addressed the role of government 
in assuring the rights of husbands and children of Jordanian women rather than the right of 
Jordanian women to pass their nationality to their families. The Jordanian national commission 
for women in Jordan is founded by a royal family member. Yet, it represents itself as a grass-
root movement. The right of Jordanian women to pass their nationality to their family is not 
among its agenda. Among its program is training courses to build the capacities of potential 
female leaders (The Jordanian National Commission for Women, n.d.). Thus, this kind of co-
optation is resembling the co-optation of political elite within the base of the authoritarian 
regime as addressed by Josua (2011). In Jordan, women’s rights movement for equality in 
nationality law is lacking the support from the State. While in Tunisia, women’s rights 
movements for equality in inheritance law are having the support from the state led by Nida 
secularist party. Yet, women’s rights movement in Tunisia need to led a wider intersectional 
mobilization. Because state feminism in Tunisia is accused by different social and political 






5 The Influence of Islam as socio-political ideology on the abolishment of marry-your-
rapist law:  
 
Khimish, has conducted a qualitative study about the influence of Islam as socio-political 
ideology on political and economic participation of Muslim women. The author argues that 
sex-segregation as part of Islamic teachings is one of the main reasons to hinder women from 
active citizenship and participation. The author addresses that the rise of Islamic movements 
was mainly political but it also influences women social status. Giving an example from 
different Islamic conservative’s narratives which are presented at TV programs, social 
networks and Friday prayers (Khimish, 2014, pp.132–142). In contrary, Rajie has addressed 
how activists from Oran city in Algeria have used the Islamic narratives to defend women’s 
rights and lobby for gender equality. The author argues that Islamic narratives have helped 
those activists to fight for gender equality. The author addresses this connection between 
Islamic narratives and mobilization for gender equality and women’s rights as a common 
situation among different female activists in the west and east (Rajie 2012, pp.51–65). 
Thus, in the following subchapters we will analyse the narratives which come from Islam as a 
socio-political ideology regarding gender roles and sexuality. In order to analyse these 
narratives as a hindering factor or an enabler factor for the abolishment of marry-your-rapist 
law from practice. Nilsen described five categories as models in the implementation science of 
policies. We will implement the determinant frameworks model to predict the outcome of 
abolishing marry-your-rapist law from practice in Jordan and Tunisia (Nilsen, 2015, pp.1–13). 
In order to predict if the abolishment of this law will lead to the abolishment of this practice or 
not. The Islamic narratives here are from Islam as a socio-political ideology. It is examined as 
an independent variable which might hinder or enable the abolishment of this law from practice 
as it was recently abolished on a legislation level.  
 
5.1 The abolishment of marry-your-rapist law from practice in Jordan:  
In the previous Jordanian panel code, the article 308 was freeing the male rapist or predator of 
sexual assaults from any charges if he marries his victim. The court can pursue the charges if 
no more than three years has passed and if the marriage did not last for five years without a 
reason (West Asia North Africa Institute, 2014, pp.13–15). Wide discontent about this law has 
emerged through social network channels. Women’s rights movements have organized 
demonstrations and established the civil coalition to abolish the law (Sister Hood is a Global 
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Institute, 2017). Thus, the wide discontent with the law represents the “emergence stage” of 
the movement. Demonstrations and signing petitions are part of the “coalescence stage” where 
collective actions are taken. Which lead finally to the “bureaucratization stage” by the 
establishment of the civil coalition to abolish the article. In April 2016, the Jordanian 
parliament has amended rather than abolishing the law. The new amendment at the time stated 
that consensual intercourse with a minor is considered as rape. The minor is a victim of rape 
and the predator can be freed from any charges if he marries his victim. Therefore, the 
amendment criminalized forced sexual intercourse as rape and it does not free the predator 
from the charges even if he marries his victim. Yet, it considers consensual sexual intercourse 
with a minor as a rape that can be dismissed from any charges if the predator marries his victim 
and she is more than 15 years old.  
The civil coalition to abolish article 308 coordinated by the Sisterhood is a Global Institute in 
Jordan has presented their arguments to the royal committee, which was appointed by the king 
of Jordan to propose legislative amendments to the Jordanian parliament. They stated that this 
law with the amendment does not protect minors. Because minors are not in the right emotional 
state to decide on marriage. They might experience violence after marriage and they might be 
forced by their families and the society to accept it (Jordanian Civil Coalition for the 
Abolishment of article 308, 2017). The royal committee has submitted their recommendation 
to abolish the law to the Jordanian parliament in 2017. The consul of ministers submitted their 
approval to abolish the law to the Jordanian parliament in the same year (Ammon, 2017). After 
parliamentary discussions between opponents and supporters, the parliament has finally voted 
for the abolishment of the law in August 2017 (Jordanian House of Representatives, 2017). 
The king of Jordan has first appointed the royal committee to propose amendments to the laws 
and Constitution in 2011 as part of the political reforms in response to the “Arab Spring” which 
reached Jordan in the same year (His Majesty King Abdullah II, 2011; Fanack, 2018). 
One can argue that the movement has “declined by success” after the Jordanian parliament had 
approved the abolishment of marry-your-rapist law. However, according to Dima Tahboub the 
spokesperson of the Islamic front party, the abolishment of this law is not enough. She 
addresses that the next responsibility is on the ministry of religious endowment and the ministry 
of education to prevent this crime from happening in the first place. This is by religious 
awareness and education (Tahboub, 2017). Lawyer and former Minister of Social 
Development, Reem Abu Hassan, has expressed her disapproval with the abolishment of this 
law. She addresses that she was aiming for the amendment rather than the abolishment of the 
law. She argues that in the shelter houses there are minor girls who had consensual sexual 
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intercourse. Thus, marrying the person whom minors had consensual sexual intercourse with 
will save them from many other troubles. Like having unregistered children as in Jordan based 
on the personal status code children out of marriage are not recognized. She emphasizes on 
other threats and social stigmas that these minor girls who had a consensual sexual intercourse 
may face (Abu Hassan, 2017). Confirming the later concerns, Dr. Ashraf Al-Omari, Media 
Director of the Department of Justice, has imposed further questions whether Jordan will 
witness an increase of crimes after the abolishment of this law? And whether there will be an 
increase of reporting on rape committed on minors after the abolishment of this law? He 
emphasizes that there will be no guarantee that the parents of the minor victim or the minor 
victim herself would report on the crime. There is no guarantee also that the offender would 
not be killed by the family of the victim as he finishes his prison sentence (Al-Omari, 2017).  
In an interview with Khaleej online, a Jordanian parliament member has asserted that rape is a 
horrible crime but Jordanian society is a conservative one, claiming that this law used to protect 
the victims and their families from the shame and social stigma. The video from the parliament 
session after the announcement of the abolishment shows a high tensed discussion between the 
opposition and the supporters of the law. The supporters of the law have declared that it is 
compatible with the social norms and traditions in the Jordanian society, because it might 
decrease the crimes of honour (Al-Salem, 2017). Thus, the supporters for this law have based 
their argument on the shame and social stigma that the victim and her family will face which 
might lead to more crimes like the crimes of honour. The crimes of honour, is a problematic 
phenomenon in Jordan. Women might be killed by their family members for their acts, if these 
acts are dishonouring the family according to the social norms. For example, a 13 years old 
girl, has been detained for two years in order to protect her from the threat that her family might 
kill her in order to protect their honour. According to the girl, she had to escape from the house 
as she and her sister were prevented from leaving and imprisoned in the house for some time. 
Her escape is perceived as an insult to the honour of her family. When she reached 18 years 
old, the judge gave her two options either to return to her family or to be transferred to the 
prison for adults. Another woman was detained for 22 years in order to protect her from a 
possible crime of honour. This is after her sister was killed by her father and brother for getting 
pregnant out of marriage bound (Thomason Reuters Foundation, 2017).  
Wafa Bani Mustafa, a member in the Jordanian parliament argues that article 308 which 
pardons the rapist if he marries his victim is coming from the old French law which was 
abolished in 1994. She argues that it has nothing to do with the social and religious norms of 
the country and this law is coming from the Egyptian Constitution, which is a mixture between 
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the French and the Turkish colonial involvement (Bani-Mustafa, 2017). It is true that in post-
colonial countries most constitutions were copy pasted from the colonizers through a 
“Lancaster model”, yet it was also done in hybrid way that fits to the social reality of the 
country (Claxton, 2003; pp.529–533). Therefore, her argument excludes the risk that this law 
will not necessary be abolished from the mind-set of the society. 
Nilsen addressed eight determinant frameworks for implementation and outcomes. The end 
users are part of the determent factors for policy implementation. In this case, the end users are 
the victims of rape and their families (Nilsen, 2015, pp.1–13). The families of the victims are 
also an end user because in the Jordanian personal code women need the approval of their legal 
guardian to get married unless they have been married before (Jordan Personal Status Law No. 
(36) section. 3. Art. 6, 1959). The features of social context like the culture and social attitude 
is also an independent variable. In this case policy makers and activists have addressed the 
shame imposed by the society on the victim and her family as a barrier to abolish this law from 
practice. In a survey conducted by SIGI, 73% of the interviewed Jordanians believe that victims 
who marry their rapist are marrying them in fear of shame. While 42% of the interviewed 
believe that victims who won’t marry their rapist they might get killed for honour by some of 
their relatives (Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI) Jordan Office, 2015). This confirms the 
views from a social worker who addressed that women from rural areas who were victims of 
sexual assaults do not perceive it as a crime as they believe it was their fault. She addresses 
that self-blame is a common phenomenon among women. In a seminar about domestic violence 
she asked some Jordanian women from rural areas if they experience domestic violence their 
answer was no. When she changed the question to “Do your husband beat you?” many 
answered yes but only when they deserve it this is why they won’t consider it as a domestic 
violence. This self-blame phenomenon exits among sexual assaults survivors, as they associate 
the incident to the way they were dressed, or are afraid that the way they acted might have 
provoked the sexual desire of the man (Interview in person, 2018, June 3, appendix B). 
Dr. Rula Quawas, a professor in the University of Jordan, has coordinated a video made by 
female students about sexual harassment on the campus. She has been dismissed from her 
position as the dean of the languages faculty after the release of the video. This made many 
associate her dismissal with the wide outrage caused by the video. Although the University of 
Jordan made a formal announcement that her dismissal from her position was a regular change 
of deans and it had nothing to do with her video on sexual harassment (University of Jordan, 
2012). Yet, this video has caused a wide outrage in the Jordanian society. The students and the 
professor were widely accused on social media and by Sharia professors, such as the well-
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known Islamic scholar Amjad Qourshah, of being without morals and trying to strip the 
Jordanian society from its morals. Qourshah has demanded that Ms. Quawas be expelled from 
the university (Qourshah, 2012, December 1; Al-Qaisi, 2012). Female students in the video 
appear with covered faces (Students at the University of Jordan, 2012).  Which can be justified 
with the victim blame theory, where female victims of sexual harassment are blamed for it. 
Thus, we argue that Islam is also hindering women’s rights movements in their mobilization 
against sexual assaults committed on women from reaching the second stage in the life cycle 
of social movements. The second stage is the “coalescence” stage, where collective actions are 
taken to express the discontent of the group (D. Hopper, 1950).  
Dr. Tahboub wrote an article in response to the video under the title “your honour is calling”. 
She expressed her unpleasant feelings toward the phenomena of sexual harassment on the 
campus. Afterward, she posed a question about the reasons. Her first answer is the dress code 
of the girls. She asked families to raise their daughters in a decent way, to dress modestly in 
order to prevent sexual harassment. As a member in the Jordanian parliament presenting the 
Islamic Front party, she has expressed her satisfaction with the abolishment of the marry-your-
rapist law. Yet, she maintains that she is not satisfied with the way of voting, because her vote 
was connected to conditions. She argues that parliamentary members were forced to vote 
without explaining their conditions. The conditions relate to the increase of religious education 
and awareness that encourage people to respect women position in Sharia laws (Tahboub, 
2017). The title of Dr. Tahboub’s article “Your honour is calling” refers to the parent and family 
responsibility of the modesty of their daughters (Tahboub, 2012). This could be linked to the 
phenomena of “crimes of honour” which refers to the killing of women who act in a way that 
dishonour their families according to the social norms. Crimes of honour is a problematic 
phenomenon in Jordan (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Dar al Iftaa in Jordan, which is 
responsible of the legislations of Sharia laws, has condemned the crimes of honour but it 
justified the punishment of people who have sexual intercourse out of marriage bound if four 
witnesses can assert that this action happened indeed (Al Iftaa Department, 2016). The same 
institution is addressing that women is responsible of dressing up modestly to prevent arousing 
men sexually (Al Iftaa Department, 2012). Thus, this imposes a further concern: Whether 
women who are not dressed up modestly according to Sharia laws shall be ashamed for being 
sexually assaulted?  
In response to this question, schizophrenia social media channel has conducted an interview in 
Jordan asking the question “is the outfit of women an excuse to sexually harass them?” Some 
have asserted that based on Sharia laws men shall not look at women but women also shall be 
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dressed modestly. Some men have found it justifiable to harass women sexually if they are not 
dressed well. One female participant asserted that Jordanian society is a conservative society 
therefore women shall dress up modestly but if they are covered up and they get harassed then 
it is a problem. Some participants have referred to the dress code as a personal freedom and 
not an excuse for sexual harassment which goes in line with the concept of secularization. 
Because the holders of this opinion have identified themselves as Muslims yet the 
acknowledged the right of others to dress differentially without getting harassed. The 
controversial debate continued in the comments thread. Some commenters have accused Arab 
women of Schizophrenia because they are demanding to be treated as glasses like it was 
referred by the Prophet Mohammad, but they won’t cover up as also asked by the prophet 
Mohammad (Schizophrenia, 2017, September 2). 
Some Jordanian women have talked to media about their experience with sexual assaults 
without giving their real names. They indicated that it was hard for them to report on it because 
the society is blaming the woman rather than the man when it comes to sexual harassment. One 
of the victims asserted that if she had reported on the sexual harassment she had experienced 
from her male professor at the University of Jordan people would have accused her that she 
was not dressed up proper or she had acted in a way that she was asking for it. Sister Hood is 
a Global Institute in Jordan, has also addressed that Jordanian women are concerned about the 
culture of shame when talking about sexual harassment or sexual assaults (Al-Othman, 2017). 
In the Shabab talk program by Deutsche Welle, a former Jordanian parliament member has 
accused a Jordanian girl who was sharing her experience with sexual harassment of being a 
liar. He insisted that Jordanian women would not be on TV channels in the first place. He 
asserted that sexual harassment was against Jordanian values and it did not exist, therefore he 
accused her of not being Jordanian. The girl appears in the video with a hat and blurry screen 
to cover her identity (Deutsche-Welle Shabab talk, 2017, November 21). This can also confirm 
the concerns that Jordanian women will not report on sexual assaults due to the fear of getting 
blamed for it. Another video, captured in Irbid city north of Jordan, shows two women who got 
publicly sexually assaulted by a group of men. Many comments under the video have accused 
the women of not being modest and acting in an indecent way that has provoked men. One 
quotes a verse from Quran that women shall settle down. The commenter interprets the verse 
as Islam honouring women by asking them to settle down at home, but not all women 
understand this point. While the person who recorded the video is questioning why the girls 
were out in the first place. The video was captured as crowds of men were in the streets 
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celebrating Germany winning a world cup match, as reported by the narrator (Omar Mahmoud, 
2014, July 14). 
This religious statement is similar to a statement made by a Jordanian parliament member in a 
parliamentary session. The male Jordanian parliament member has asked his female colleague 
to sit down and stop talking. When she proceeded with her argument, he blamed the person 
who decided to bring female quota to the parliament. He quoted words of prophet Mohamad, 
saying that “the prophet said a prayer of a woman in her room is better than going to the 
mosque”, and telling women that they shall stay at home (Jordanian Parliament, 2014). The 
human rights report by the US State Department confirms that women in Jordan do not report 
on sexual assaults, because it is considered as a taboo, while the government is not taking 
sufficient measures to enforce the laws which criminalize sexual harassment (United States 
Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2017, p.30). 
In an interview about sexual harassment in the Arab world, some activists argued that sexual 
harassment and rape are caused by the lack of religious awareness. Others argued that it 
happened due to the patriarchal culture (Al-Rubaie, 2015). The Islamic narratives in Jordan 
condemn sexual harassment and rape, yet they also preach about women’s responsibility to be 
covered and to be modest in order to reduce crimes in the society. In 2013, Sheikh ben Rasheed, 
the vice president of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan condemned the recommendations by 
the United Nations to criminalize marital rape, to allow women to travel alone and to use 
contraception. He asserted that this is against the Islamic values. He declared that sexual 
liberation for women would increase sexual harassment. He claimed the recommendations by 
United Nations were part of westernization (Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, 2013).  
Therefore, we argue that these Islamic narratives on sexuality, gender roles and women social 
status is a determinant factor, which may influence the end users’ reporting on rape and sexual 
assaults, i.e. it might hinder women from reporting. The reviewed Islamic narratives justify the 
survey conducted by SIGI. Where 73% of Jordanians believe that victims marry their rapist in 
fear of shame. Tamkeen Centre for Support and Solidarity has conducted a study on forced 
marriage and marriage of minors. The study was based on reports issued by the Chambers of 
Justice and General Statistics on Marriage during the year 2017. It shows that 10,434 minors 
got married in 2016; of which 846 cases were the difference between the age of wives and 
spouses of 15 years and more. The study argues that in some of the marriages the minors were 
manipulated by their legal guardian. The personal status code in Jordan demands the approval 
of the guardian of women when they get married unless they were married before. The study 
addresses that in some cases the marriage was an economical deal between the guardian and 
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the future husband (Tamkeen Center for Support and Solidarity, 2018). Thus, this brings 
another determinant factor that the guardian of the victim of rape might influence her decision 
in marrying the rapist in fear of social stigma and fear.  
 
5.2 The abolishment of marry-your-rapist law from practice in Tunisia  
In 2016, the article 227 which frees the rapist from any charges if he marries his victim has 
come under the coverage of different media channels. The law was brought up into debate after 
one judge has dismissed a 21 years old man from charges after he married a 14 years old girl 
who he previously had sexual intercourse with. The judge argued that it turned out it is a 
consensual sex and thus based on the article 227 from the Tunisian panel code the charges shall 
be dismissed as the marriage will happen ("Rape is a murderous crime" campaign, 2016). 
In the same year, a well-known social TV program hosted a minor girl who was crying and 
sharing her experience with rape. She stated that she was raped by three of her far male relatives 
which made her pregnant. Later on, her father kicked her out from the house after he found out 
about her pregnancy. The male presenter suggested to the minor to marry one of her rapists and 
to apologize to her father and family because she hurt their honour (Payton, 2016). A wide 
discontent went around the country calling to end the law 227 and to end the victim shame. 
Thousands of people have joined the Facebook page “Marry your rapist he said, see you at the 
court we respond” (Epouse ton violeur, dit-il. On se voit au tribunal, lui répondons-nous, 2016 
October 17).  
In October 2016, the Supreme Commission for Audio-visual Communication decided to stop 
the program and to delete all the videos where the minor identity is exposed. The commission 
addressed different accusations to the channel. Which includes exposing a minor to social and 
psychological threats. Especially that the program did not hide the identity of the guest. In an 
interview with the presenter he argued that the medical documents have shown that the sexual 
intercourse was consensual. He asked people to sue and blame the law 227 rather than blaming 
him for suggesting to implement the law (Al Shaaby, 2016; Supreme Independent Commission 
for Audio-visual Communication, 2016). 
Women’s rights movements have led wide demonstrations and wrote a letter to the president 
of the country which brought their case into the “Agenda sitting” by bringing it to the debate 
of the Tunisian parliament (Middle-east online, 2016). Schumaker, identified agenda sitting as 
part of political responsiveness where social movements manage to bring their cases to the 
political debate (Schumaker, 1975). In 2017, the Tunisian parliament had voted with consensus 
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on the abolishment of the article. Media channels addressed the voting process as a unity of 
Tunisian voices (Tunisian Government, 2017). 
Al-Trabelsi, a Tunisian activist, addresses that Tunisia is considered as one of the first countries 
to criminalize sexual harassment. Yet, sexual harassment against women is still accumulating 
(Al-Trabelsi, 2015). According to the Center for Research, Studies, Documentation and 
Information on Women, the sexual harassment committed on women has increased up to 74% 
in 2017. Yet, women’s rights advocates have addressed the positive point. That this increase 
of reports on sexual harassment is a positive sign that women are now more aware of their 
rights and more willing to report on sexual assaults (The Center for Research, Studies, 
Documentation and Information on Women, 2017). Yet, Mariam al Nassiri, a journalist from 
Tunisia has argued that most of the female victims of rape would not report on rape as they are 
afraid of shame and stigma. She justified her argument through several interviews with victims 
of rape (Al-Nassiri, 2018).  
Al-Trabelsi, argues that sexual assaults committed on women are increasing due to different 
factors, like the fear of society, women are afraid that if they speak up against harassment they 
will be blamed and scandalized among the society (Al-Trabelsi, 2015). Thus, predators assault 
women assuming that they would not have the courage to report on it. In a reportage published 
by Nessma national TV about sexual harassment in Tunisia the presenter addresses that women 
who experienced sexual harassment refused to talk about it because they were afraid from 
scandal. The same reportage published on their Facebook channel has received 184 comments 
with over 100 comments referring to the revealing clothes of women as the reason for sexual 
harassment. Many comments have addressed dressing up modestly according to Islamic laws 
as the tool to avoid sexual harassment (Nessma, 2016, March 31). In the street talk interviews 
conducted by Nawaat TV about sexual harassment and its causes, some Tunisians have 
addressed the lack of security after the Arab Spring as one of the causes while others addressed 
the mentality. The dress code debate was present among the interviewees. Some saw it as self-
responsibility for the woman to dress up in respectful manner while others said it is not related. 
One participant gave an example from Europe as a place where women wear miniskirts and 
still do not get harassed (Nawaat, 2014, March 24).  
The report by the international commission of jurists on obstacles that hinder women access to 
justice in Tunisia, indicates that social and religious norms can hinder women from reporting 
on rape and sexual assaults committed on them (The international commission of jurists. 2016, 
p.20). Basheer ben Hassan is one of the known Islamic preachers in the Tunisian society 
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(Bachire Ben Hsan, 2011, February). During his weekly preaches at the mosque he addresses 
women status within different Sharia laws. Among it, he addresses women behaviour and their 
dress code as an important element for a healthy society. He said “Tabarruj” was a sin that 
Muslim Tunisian women had fallen to. “Tabarruj” is the display of beauty (Aboo Daawood et 
al, n.d.). He maintains that the “Tabarruj” of women is a trigger for crimes and instability in 
the society (Shaykh Basheer Bin Hassan, 2011). This is a typical lecture from different 
Tunisian clerics (Al Koky, 2011). Thus, one might argue that Islamic narratives by religious 
leaders are a determining factor that might hinder women from reporting on rape as they would 
be afraid to be blamed for it.  
Wafa al Hekery, a Tunisian blogger has blogged about the supervision of men on women as 
mentioned in Quran. She argues that it is right for women to be supervised by men, because 
when the man is the director and the supervisor of the family, that means that he shall provide 
the financial support. Then it is the woman right to get this financial support. In return, women 
shall accept their role and provide back for their husbands. She uses in her blog verses from 
Quran with interpretations from the Palestinian Islamic scholar Bassam Jarrar (Al-hekery, 
2017). Bassam Jarrar, like many other scholars have interpreted the verses from Quran, in 
support to the right of men to supervise their wives not to go out from the right path of God. 
He addresses his argument to men telling them: “for these women who are out from the path 
of |God first advise them, if they do not listen then leave them in beds and if they do not listen 
then beat them”. Jarrar, justifies the beating that it is not a strong beating but rather a soft one. 
Therefore, women who go out from the path can be punished by their husbands. The path is 
the right path of Islam and God (Jarrar, 2014). 
Fatam Azouz, is a scholar on women studies. During an interview with al-hurra news channel 
she associated the rise of sexual assaults on Tunisian women as a result of changing the status 
quo where women now have more rights. She explains that this became a challenge to men and 
to the macho culture. She addresses that some men became more aggressive toward women as 
women have more rights and they are taking more places in leadership (Azouz, 2017). Thus, 
one might argue that the Islamic narratives which put men as supervisors of women might 
hinder the abolishment of physical violence against women.  
The minister of education in Tunisia had led a reform campaign to reform and develop the 
educational system. He has clarified that the Islamic education is mandatory and will stay 
mandatory as its cancelation might cause extremism (Tunisian Minister of Education, 2016). 
In the Tunisian curriculum, there is some classes where Quran is read and memorized. In 
addition to these classes, the ministry of education and the ministry of religious affairs have 
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signed an agreement to make an optional summer camps for children to memorize Quran. This 
agreement has launched controversial debates between supporters and opposition. Mohammad 
Khalil the minister of religious affairs, declared that these courses are to combat extremism. 
Different Academics, media and unionists have attacked his argument saying this will make a 
generation of “Daesh” the nickname of ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Sasy, 2016). 
Therefore, Islamic education is mandatory for children in Tunisia. Thus, gender roles and 
women social status based on Sharia laws is part of the social context as a determinant factor. 
This factor which might enable or hinder women and girls from reporting on sexual assaults 
rather than marrying their rapist.  
Bilqis Mashri, a women's rights activist and former vice-president of the Tunisian League for 
the Defence of Human Rights, states that women’s rights movement in Tunisia have launched 
over the years many public campaigns of awareness to combat sexual assaults committed on 
women. She addresses that the laws are not always applicable because it is hard to prove sexual 
harassment. She illustrates with an example of women who were afraid to report on sexual 
harassments committed on them by a male colleague. She addresses that many victims 
experience sexual harassment and in different cases it might develop to rape. Yet, they won’t 
report on it. Because they are afraid that the society will blame them. Under the documented 
interview with Ms. Mashri, two commenters addressed women cloths as the trigger for rape 
and sexual assaults. Another commenter responded that in Islam God asked men not to stare at 
women too. The same commenter continues to address women dress code. Stating that 
“Women’s clothes are sometimes decent, yet they get sexually assaulted”. In response to the 
later argument, one commenter is clarifying that “yes indeed Islam asked men not to stare at 
women, but it also asked women to cover up. It is not logical to ask men not to sexually harass 
women when women are sexually harassing men by wearing revealing cloths and asking for 
it” (Qassim, 2018). 
Al Jouini, a Tunisian journalist addresses that women who get raped and report on it would 
receive questions like: “Why you were dressed like that? Why you have been out alone? Why 
have you reported on it and scandalized yourself?” Al Jouini has associated these blames to the 
Islamic interpretations of Quran. She argues that the Islamic Salafist interoperations of Quran 
has put women as responsible for sexual assaults (Al Jouini, 2013).  
In contrary, Olfa Youssef a Tunisian scholar and journalist argues that she is an Islamic feminist 
because she is defending women’s rights and gender equality through the Islamic narratives. 
She argues the Islamic feminists in Tunisia have more influence on the society than Tunisian 
feminists who are detached from religion (Youssef, 2016). On an empirical level, the wide 
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most known and recent campaign to stop sexual assaults in public transport is “predators are 
not welcomed to have a ride with us”. This campaign did not use any Islamic narratives in their 
mobilization. Nisreen Tunsi, one of the members of the campaign has shared publicly her 
experience with sexual assaults. She shared about the time she was publicly assaulted in the 
bus by a stranger and the other passengers did not condemn the predator act. She has addressed 
that after she shared her story on social media many women have contacted her. They shared 
with her about the sexual assaults they experienced and told her that they cannot report on it 
because they are afraid of being judged or condemned from their families and the society 
(Tunsi, 2017; CREDIF, 2017, September 25).  
In response to this campaign M TV Tunisia, has conducted one-hour TV talk show with an 
Islamic scholar and the president of the Sharia legislation department at Zaytouna University, 
Dr. Omar. Dr. Omar has condemned rape and sexual harassment asserting that this is out of 
Sharia and Islamic teachings. Soon enough by the minuet 15 from the interview, the Islamic 
scholar addresses the distance from religion as the trigger of sexual harassment and rape. He 
emphasizes on nudity and homosexuality. The presenter askes Dr. Omar a question regarding 
to the recent campaign “the sexual predator shall not take a ride with us”. The presenter asks 
“If it is the duty of women to report on sexual assaults? Dr. Omar responded that the first and 
main duty of women is to dress up modestly and not to tempt men by wearing revealing cloths. 
He addresses women by the expression “Our daughters” which is in line with the concept of 
patriarchal culture. Dr. Omar says “Our daughters shall not push men to stuck on them. They 
can avoid this by not wearing revealing cloths and exposing themselves. God said in Quran 
stay away from sexuality out of marriage bound. Our daughters shall stay away from revealing 
their bodies. In order not to arouse men sexually. Thus, not to push men to follow them and 
harass them”. He continues stating that “Our daughters shall first dress modestly to earn 
respect. Not necessarily to cover the hair but to be modest and then they can report on sexual 
assaults”. When he was asked “Families are sometimes ashamed of reporting on rape or 
assaults committed on their daughters what do you think about this?” the cleric answered “They 
should be ashamed of leaving their daughters acting and dressing not modestly rather than 
being ashamed to report on sexual assaults” (M Tunisia TV, 2017). 
Al Zaytouna university in Tunisia is one of the oldest and most influential religious institutions 
in Tunisia (Mosque of Zaytouna, 2012). Such an influence is visible on the social narratives 
which countered the women’s rights movement to stop sexual assault committed on women. 
Different people has attacked the aim of the movement by describing the outfit of women as 
the reason for sexual assaults. One man supported by other men in one video has asserted that 
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women shall get covered not to get sexually assaulted. He said her father and brother shall not 
let her go out dressed up in a way which is not modest. When the female presenter asked him 
“But isn’t it her right to dress up as she wants?” he replied then “when I rape her no one shall 
blame me”. Other male voices in the video have cheered for his argument (Al Nafeth, 2017). 
Islamic narratives criminalize rape and sexual assaults. But it also shames women who are not 
dressed modest according to Sharia laws. It also shames the family of women who are not 
dressed in a modest manner according to the Islamic teachings. 
We argue that “marry-your-rapist law” might not be abolished from practice. Because of social 
pressure and victim blame which is influenced by Islamic narratives and might hinder the 
female victims from reporting on the assaults in the first place. Our argument goes in line with 
the findings of Samkange in Zimbabwe. And the findings of Erny Ma in Serbia. The authors 
concluded that radical feminist approach is needed to challenge the social structure. The 
authors indicated that in Zimbabwe and Serbia, the reforms of discriminatory policies based on 
gender is not enough to end gender-based discrimination in practice (Samkange, 2015; Erny 
Ma, 2014, pp.198–213). We argue that the hindering obstacles for women to report on sexual 
assaults are sourced from the Islamic narratives. Thus, we recommend women’s rights 
movements in Tunisia to use a secular bottom up approach when combating the narratives that 
blame victims of sexual assaults.  
 
5.3 Comparative conclusion between Jordan and Tunisia: 
The voting process to abolish marry-your-rapist law in Tunisia was faster and, in more 
consensus, comparing to Jordan. Yet, women in Tunisia and in Jordan have addressed concerns 
to report on sexual assaults due the culture of shame. The culture of shame, refers to the stigma 
imposed on female victims and their families. It is sometimes directly linked to the Islamic 
narratives. Islamic scholars in both countries have addressed women dress code and Chasity in 
women as a tool to combat sexual assaults committed on them. These narratives are preached 
in mosques, social media networks and national TV programs. The interviews conducted about 
sexual assaults committed against women in Tunisia and in Jordan came up with similar 
narratives.  
 
The main three narratives are: 1. Women shall dress up modestly, if they are dressed modestly 
and they got sexually harassed then it is not their fault. 2. In Islam women are asked to dress 
up modestly, but if they do not it is not an excuse or a reason to harass them. 3. Dress code is 
a personal freedom and its never the fault of women if they get sexually assaulted. Thus, to 
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secularize the narratives on women and sexuality is the tool for women’s rights movements in 
Tunisia and in Jordan to make sure to abolish “marry-your-rapist law” from practice and from 
the mind-set of the society. Our recommendation goes in line with the findings of Samkange 
in Zimbabwe and the findings of Erny. Ma in Serbia. Both scholars have addressed that a 
radical feminist approach is needed to abolish gender-based discrimination from the society 
because legal reforms is not enough (Samkange, 2015; Erny Ma, 2014, pp.198–213). Our 
conclusion is based on the determinant frameworks model by Nilsen (2015). Where we argue 
that victim blame and stigma imposed on the victims of rape and their families is a factor which 
hinders women from reporting on sexual assaults. When we analysed the Islamic narratives, 
we found that this stigma is sourced from the Islamic narratives.  
 
We also found that women’s rights movements to combat victim blame in Tunisia have 
managed to reach the “coalescence stage”. Despite the Islamic narratives against their cause. 
Meanwhile in Jordan, the women’s rights movements to combat the social stigma and victim 
blame is hindered by the Islamic opposition from going into the coalescence stage. From the 
findings of the first chapter, we argue that the secularization which was imposed in Tunisia 
since its dependence in 1956, and the fact that the democratic transitions is currently led by al 
Nida secularist party has contributed in creating a supportive environment for women’s rights 


















6 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, women’s rights movements in Jordan and Tunisia have become mobilized after 
the Arab Spring to reform policies which discriminate against them. Despite different types of 
democratic transition, women’s rights movements in both countries have been encountering 
similar challenges. These challenges and the good practices of the movements could be applied 
as a general frame for further studies on women’s rights movements in the Arab-Muslim 
countries. 
The movements to constitutionalize gender equality in both countries faced opposition which 
based its arguments on the Islamic teachings. The concept of women’s rights varies from one 
group to another in the same country. We studied Women’s rights movements that campaigned 
for full gender equality in all sectors. The opposition referred to women’s rights as different 
from gender equality. The Islamic narratives discussed women’s rights within gender 
complimentary roles based on Sharia laws rather than in the context of full equality in all 
sectors. This goes in line with the findings of McBride and G. Mazur. The authors identified 
women’s movements by their female actors and gendered discourse, which is not necessarily 
for a feminist cause. Some female activists in Jordan and Tunisia have identified themselves 
as advocates for women’s rights, yet they asserted that they are not advocating for gender 
equality. 
Thus, we conclude that feminists campaigning for women’s rights in Jordan and Tunisia are 
advocating for gender equality in all sectors. Feminists in Jordan and Tunisia are in support of 
1. The women’s rights movements’ efforts to constitutionalize gender equality in Jordan and 
Tunisia; and 2. The women’s rights movement’s efforts for equality in inheritance law in 
Tunisia. When it comes to the “My nationality is the right for my children” women’s rights 
movement, there are two kind of members. Some women are part of this movement because 
they believe in gender equality in all sectors, while others only support the right of women to 
pass their nationality to their families, but not necessarily gender equality in all sectors. 
Some Islamic female activists in Jordan supported women’s rights movements in their 
endeavours to gain the right for women to pass their nationality to their families, yet they do 
not support the constitutionalization or the concept of gender equality. While in Tunisia female 
Islamic activists have advocated for gender equality in the Constitution, yet they do not support 
women’s rights movements campaigning for gender equality in inheritance law. Thus, based 
on the reviewed literature on women’s movements and feminism, we argue that they are 
70 
 
advocates for women’s rights, but not feminists, since feminists in Jordan and Tunisia are 
women’s rights advocates for gender equality in all sectors.  
Women’s rights movement to constitutionalize gender equality have declined by success in 
Tunisia but it did not in Jordan. In Tunisia the movement had the privilege to mentor and to 
participate in the process of making the new Constitution through an elected National 
Constitution Assembly. We found that the Tunisian women’s rights movement, has combated 
the Islamic narratives for gender complimentary roles instead of gender equality through mass 
mobilization and by creating “The Constitution of Citizenship and Equality through the Eyes 
of Women”. This mobilization was from bottom-up approach and they managed to put their 
demands among the priorities of the political elite. We conclude from the reviewed narratives 
that under the pressure of this mobilization, members at the Islamic party al Nahda, have finally 
approved the inclusion of gender equality in the Constitution. Thus, we argue that women’s 
rights movements have saved the democratic transition in Tunisia from a reversed wave.  
In contrary, in Jordan the Royal committee to propose amendments in the Constitution was 
appointed by the king and it had no women in it. Thus, we argue that the radical transition from 
the Lancaster model to popular participation is an assist for women’s rights advocates for 
gender equality to achieve their demands. The royal committee did not address the 
constitutionalization of gender equality among its proposed amendments despite the demands 
from women’s rights movements. Further, the government put further restrictions on freedom 
of expression and cyber activism. Thus, we argue that the marginalization of women’s rights 
leads to further restrictions on other democratic values. This goes in line with the findings of 
professor, Steven Fish. He has associated women marginalization as one of the main factors 
for the failure to robust democracy. 
Further, we found that the history of secularization in Tunisia imposed from top-down 
approach since 1956 has also assisted women’s rights movements for gender equality in 
Tunisia. This history has continued by the radical transition led by al Nida secularist party after 
the Arab Spring. This radical transition is similar to the findings of Melo in Portugal which we 
have reviewed in the literature review. Melo addressed that when the second wave of 
democratization reached Portugal the left parties led the government, this helped women’s 
rights movements to achieve legal reforms. In contrary, in Jordan the “Iftaa” department to 
legislate laws based on Sharia laws is more influential than in Tunisia. The “Iftaa” department 
is integrated with the legislation of the personal status code. Under the personal status code, 
we reviewed different discriminatory laws against women. Thus, we argue that without 
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secularism women’s rights movements will not be able to achieve their demands for gender 
equality in all sectors in Jordan.  
Despite the success of Women’s rights movements in constitutionalizing gender equality in 
Tunisia they are currently encountering further Islamic opposition in achieving gender equality 
in inheritance. The Islamic party al Nahda has officially rejected to legalized the equal 
inheritance law in August 2018. We found that the Islamic opposition is sourced from Sharia 
laws. Islamic scholars addressed equality in inheritance as contradictory to Sharia laws. Sharia 
laws are sourced from Quran and Sunnah. Sunnah is the instructions from the life of the 
prophet. Based on the Islamic narratives these laws shall not and cannot be reversed. The 
Islamic opposition legalized its arguments based on the Islamic identity in the Tunisian 
Constitution. We found that these narratives are basing their arguments on a patriarchal point 
of view. They argue that men shall receive more inheritance because they are the responsible 
of the household. Thus, based on our findings we conclude that women’s rights movements 
shall seek for the secularization of the Constitution in order to achieve full gender equality in 
all sectors. By this argument we disagree with the recommendation by Dr. El Masri for 
Tunisian feminists to get acquainted with Quran verses in order to combat the Islamic 
narratives, and we agree with the findings of Mojab in Iran, who argues that sourcing women’s 
rights narratives from Islamic teachings creates a patriarchal system that cannot be fought. 
Based on the Islamic narratives in Jordan, we predict the same outcome for Jordanian feminists. 
In the third chapter on political Islam and public policies on gender equality, we have mainly 
researched the narratives of women’s rights movements for gender equality, which is not 
sourced from Islamic teachings, and their opposition, which based its arguments on Islamic 
teachings. Among the narratives, there were some narratives from Muslims who do not demand 
the implementation of Islamic laws on a legislation level. Thus, we assume that there might be 
a possible transformation of Islam as a religion which is not in contradiction with secularism. 
Thus, a further study is still needed to analyse a possible support from Islamic leaders to the 
concept of secularization when it comes to public policies on gender equality.  
In our research we came across the CEDAW treaty by the United Nations. The treaty is rejected 
by its opponents in Jordan and Tunisia as a tool of westernization. We suggest that this rejection 
is triggered by the post-colonial identity, because Jordan was colonized by England, while 
Tunisia was colonized by France. We thus recommend further research into the post-colonial 
identity and the rejection of international treaties in the Arab world. We predict that a creation 
of Arab regional treaties to stop all kind of discrimination against women might be a possible 
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replacement for international treaties. Yet, our research was not focused on this topic, thus we 
identify the need for further research on it.  
In the fourth chapter, we examine the second challenge, which we found as having an impact 
on women’s rights movements for gender equality in Jordan and Tunisia – state feminism. The 
government of Tunisia led by the Al Nida secularist party adapted and led the initiative for 
equal inheritance law. Al Nida secularist party led by the president of the country Essebsi, is 
accused of trying to cover up for corruption and nepotism. The previous dictator regimes in 
Tunisia have used the feminist card while oppressing feminist activists who stood against 
corruption and nepotism. This led to the creation of selective feminism and it increased the 
socio-economic gap between women.  
We found that the current women’s rights movements in Tunisia are trying to create an 
intersectional feminism in order to combat selective feminism. Women’s rights movements 
have joined the anti-corruption campaign against the law of reconciliation. The law of 
reconciliation is proposed by president Essebsi to free political figures who served under the 
previous dictator regimes from charges related to nepotism and corruption. We analysed the 
narratives used by the women’s rights movements for equality in inheritance. In response to 
selective feminism, they shifted their narratives to include women from marginalized areas. 
The leaders of the movements have asserted that equality in inheritance will also help women 
who face bad economical situations in marginalized areas. We find these steps as positive ones. 
Yet, it needs to use different tools to reach and include women from marginalized areas in their 
mobilization. The topic is still actual. Thus, a further research is needed on intersectional 
feminism and its influence in combating selective feminism to achieve equality in inheritance 
law in Tunisia. Currently the movement is supported by the state. Yet, the movement needs a 
wider social support in order to pressure the parliament to vote in favour for this law.  
In Jordan, the state feminism is taking a negative position regarding women’s rights 
movements for equality in a nationality law. We found that the government of Jordan has 
increased the quota of women in the parliament and it had appointed 7 female ministers for the 
first time in the history of the country as part of the political reforms. Yet, the national 
commission for Jordanian women is founded by one of the royal family members. Their 
program contains training courses to build the capacities of potential female leaders. Giving 
women an equal right in the nationality law is not part of their agenda. Dr. Omar al Razaz is 
the new prime minister in Jordan and he was assigned by the king. Despite, his positive move 
to appoint 7 female ministers, he neglected the demands from some parliamentary members to 
include gender equality in the nationality law as part of the new government agenda. Thus, we 
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conclude that in Jordan the authoritarian regime is co-opting its own base to assure its 
continuity. This goes in line with the theory presented by Josua, that authoritarian regimes are 
mostly co-opting its own political elites to expand its own base. 
In April 2018, the national commission for Jordanian women created an alliance with grass-
root movements like “My nationality is the right for my family”. The topic is still current, so 
further research is still needed to determine whether this cooperation will lead to the success 
or failure of the women’s right movements for equality in the nationality law. The grass root 
movements for equality in the nationality law has led its mobilization from the emergence stage 
to the coalescence stage then to the bureaucratization stage successfully, as we have illustrated 
in chapter three. However, we also analysed the current shift in the narratives of the movement. 
The shift is turning from equality in nationality law to assuring rights for the foreign husbands 
and children of Jordanian women. We also suggest that feminists in Jordan might learn from 
the experience of feminists in Tunisia. Selective feminism and co-optation have also appeared 
as a challenge in Tunisia. Thus, intersectional feminism might be considered further as a 
possible tool to combat selective feminism in Jordan. Yet, a further research is still needed on 
the topic. Time is also needed to determine the result of the recent co-optation of grass roots 
movements for equality in nationality law in Jordan. Eventually, intersectional feminism might 
not be easy to apply in Jordan comparing to Tunisia. Because of the differences in the political 
context. We have illustrated how the government in Jordan has imposed restrictions on freedom 
of speech, and on cyber activism. One of the main grass root female activists asserted how 
social media has helped her to mobilize other women. We also reviewed feminists’ campaigns 
on social media which works as an agitator to create the first cycle of the social movement. 
Our findings go in line with the findings of C. Radsch. C. Radsch, addressed that the online 
campaigns were an important tool for women in other Arab countries like Tunisia, Egypt and 
Yemen. Thus, with these restrictions we assume that intersectional feminism might be hard to 
reach in Jordan. Because women’s rights advocates have their limitations for mass mobilization 
and to reach women from different backgrounds. Thus, a further research is needed to find 
possible good practices and techniques to combat the co-optation of political elite and feminism 
in Jordan.  
In the fifth chapter, we found that legal reforms in Tunisia and Jordan which led to the 
abolishment of the marry-your-rapist law are not enough to abolish this law from practice. 
National interviews and surveys indicated that women who experienced sexual assaults are not 
willing to report on it in both countries, because they are afraid that they will be blamed for it 
by their families and by the society. We considered the determinants frameworks described by 
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Nilsen. We found that Islam as socio-political ideology is hindering women as an end user 
from reporting on sexual assaults and rape. Because the Islamic narratives have created a social 
stigma on women who experienced sexual assaults and rape. By analysing the Islamic 
narrative, we found that this social stigma is sourced from the Islamic teachings in the two 
countries. The Islamic narratives have associated Chasity in women and the modest dress code 
of women as the main tool to combat sexual assaults and rape. It asserted that it is the 
responsibility of women not to sexually arouse men. We analysed the influence of these 
narratives on the social narratives which justify the sexual assaults on women who are not dress 
up modestly.  
However, the situation in Jordan is more complicated, because women need the approval of 
their legal guardians to get married. Sharia laws are integrated in the personal status code in 
Jordan. The national qualitative study by Tamkeen Centre for Solidarity in Jordan has shown 
that in some cases minors are manipulated by their families into getting married. Further, by 
analysing the narratives of the supporters of the marry-your-rapist law, we found that women 
who get raped are in danger of getting killed by their family members under the cover of the 
crimes of honour. The law on crimes of honour tolerates the crimes committed against women, 
if they directly or indirectly jeopardize the reputation of the family according to the social 
norms. This law was amended in Jordan in 2017. Yet, we identify the need for a further study 
on whether the amendment of this law will lead to the abolishment of this phenomenon from 
practice. 
During our research we had a limited access to transparent surveys and statistics. Social and 
political activists have asserted that women in Tunisia and Jordan are not eager to report on 
sexual assaults and rape because they are afraid of the social stigma. Thus, we identify the need 
for further qualitative research to document such a study with ethical consideration and privacy 
protection. In this chapter, we have analysed the social debates in Tunisia and Jordan which 
push women who are victims of rape to marry their rapists in order to avoid the social stigma 
and to protect the honour of their families. We argue that these social debates are sourced from 
the Islamic teachings and it push women to marry their rapists by blaming them for getting 
raped. 
We agree with Wafa Bani Mustafa, that marry-your-rapist law might have been copied from 
the French Constitution through the Lancaster model. But we also argue that this copy was 
made because it fits to the social context of the Jordanian and Tunisian society. We supported 
our arguments through the narratives we analysed in the fifth chapter. The main three narratives 
are: 1. Women shall dress up modestly, if they are dressed modestly and they got sexually 
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assaulted then it is not their fault; 2. In Islam women are asked to dress up modestly, but if they 
do not it is not an excuse or a reason to harass them; 3. Dress code is a personal freedom and 
its never the fault of women if they get sexually assaulted. Thus, the secularization of the 
narratives on women and sexuality is the tool that women’s rights movements in Tunisia and 
in Jordan can use to make sure to abolish the “marry-your-rapist law” from practice and from 
the mind-set of the society. Thus, we predict that the abolishment of the marry-your-rapist law 
at the legislative level will not lead to its elimination from practice until a more radical feminist 
approach is taken at the social level. Our argument goes in line with the findings of Samkange 
in Zimbabwe, and the findings of Erny Ma in Serbia, which we have reviewed in the literature 
review. The authors concluded that radical feminist approach is needed to challenge the social 
structure. The authors indicated that in Zimbabwe and Serbia, the reforms of discriminatory 
policies based on gender is not enough to end gender-based discrimination in practice.  
Our last concluding remark is from our analysis of the life cycles of women’s rights movements 
to combat the social stigma on women who faced sexual harassment in Jordan and Tunisia. We 
found that the movement in Tunisia has managed to reach the second life cycle which is 
“calescence” despite the socio-Islamic narratives which opposed them. In contrary, in Jordan 
the movement is still in the first stage which is the “emergence” state. The Islamic preachers 
have publicly condemned and encountered the collective actions taken by some advocates 
which led to its limitation within the emergence stage. Blumer, addressed the first stage as the 
stage where the social actors are the agitators. We found that women’s rights movements are 
still working as an agitator to spread awareness about women’s rights to choose their dress 
without getting sexually assaulted or shamed in Jordan. In Jordan and Tunisia, we focused our 
analysis on the narratives from women’s rights advocates who promote secularization by 
indicating that the dress code and sexuality are women’s personal choice. On the other hand, 
their Islamic opposition claimed that the dress code of women and their Chasity are an Islamic 
social law, which shall be respected in order to combat sexual assaults committed on women. 
Yet, between these two narratives, we found a narrative in between, which referred to Islam as 
a religion for personal piety rather than a socio-political law for everyone to follow. These 
narratives appeared to be in minority. 
Yet, we predict that these narratives indicate a possible cooperation between advocates for 
gender equality and Islamic leaders, if the Islamic leaders are willing to promote secularism 
through the teachings of Islam. With this recommendation, we disagree with the 
recommendation from Dr. El Masri that feminists should get equipped with verses from Quran 
during their ongoing mobilization. But we agree on the possibility of cooperation, where 
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Islamic teachings are compatible with secularism. Thus, we suggest a further research into 
Islam and secularism through the Islamic narratives in Tunisia and Jordan. 
Finally, we explain the success of women’s rights movements in Tunisia to reach the second 
life cycle, and their failure in Jordan with our findings from the third chapter. We connect this 
success to the secularization process, which was imposed in Tunisia from the top, and the 
radical democratic transition which is currently led by Al Nida secularist party. While in 
Jordan, Sharia laws are integrated in the personal status code, which strengthens the Islamic 
socio-political narratives and their influence on the social status of women. These narratives 
are hindering women’s rights movements in their campaign against sexual assaults from going 



























7 Summary in Slovenian language 
 
Ženska gibanja se po arabski pomladi borijo za reforme spolno diskriminatorne zakonodaje. 
Arabska pomlad se je začela v Tuniziji leta 2010. Padec vladajočega režima leta 2011 je 
privedel do radikalnih sprememb. Val demokratizacije je še istega leta dosegel Jordanijo. 
Arabska pomlad v Tuniziji in Egiptu je navdahnila množične proteste. Vladni režim se je na 
nemire odzval s političnimi reformami. Kljub razlikam v načinih demokratizacije pa se ženska 
gibanja tako v Tuniziji kot v Jordaniji borijo za podobne cilje. Obe državi sta v svojih ustavah 
opredeljeni kot arabski muslimanski državi. Z induktivnim sklepanjem in kvalitativnimi 
metodami želimo postaviti splošni okvir glavnih dejavnikov, ki ženskim gibanjem pri delu v 
obeh državah pomagajo, in tistih, ki jih pri njihovem boju ovirajo. Ta splošni okvir se pozneje 
lahko uporabi za druge raziskave o ženskih gibanjih v arabskih muslimanskih državah.  
Pri pregledu literature o feminizmu in ženskih gibanjih smo zaključili, da se ženska gibanja ne 
nujno zavzemajo za feministične cilje (McBride in G. Mazur, 2008). Zato uporabljamo frazo 
gibanja za ženske pravice. Pregled literature je tudi pokazal, da vrsta demokratizacije lahko 
ovira ali spodbuja gibanja za ženske pravice pri boju za enakost spolov (Melo 2016). V 
nekaterih državah se pravne reforme ne vedno izvajajo zaradi družbenih in kulturnih norm 
(Samkange, 2015; Erny Ma, 2014). Poleg tega smo tudi proučili diskurz o pravicah žensk v 
arabskih državah. Ugotovili smo, da se večina kontroverznih razprav dotika odnosa med 
islamom, ženskimi pravicami in enakostjo spolov (Hollis, 2013; Lazerg, 2013; program 
Channel 4, 2018). Zato smo islamsko družbeno-politično ideologijo obravnavali tudi kot 
dejavnik, ki gibanja za pravice žensk podpira ali ovira pri boju za enakost spolov z različnimi 
stopnjami politične odzivnosti. 
Z ocenjevanjem konceptov smo podrobneje analizirali gibanja za pravice žensk v Jordaniji in 
Tuniziji. Ugotovili smo, da se širši diskurz pravic žensk razlikuje od diskurza enakih pravic 
žensk. Slednje imenujemo feminizem. V Tuniziji so se gibanja za pravice žensk borila za vnos 
enakosti spolov v ustavo in se zdaj zavzemajo za enakost spolov v dednem pravu. V Jordaniji 
se borijo za vnos enakosti spolov v ustavo in enakost spolov v zakon o državljanstvu. Nekateri 
podporniki gibanja v Jordaniji podpirajo pravico žensk, da se njihovo državljanstvo prenese na 
potomce, pri tem pa ne nujno podpirajo popolne enakosti na vseh področjih. V Tuniziji so bile 
zahteve glede vpisa enakosti spolov v ustavo uspešne, v Jordaniji pa niso obrodile sadov. Z 
etnografsko raziskavo smo preučili glavne dejavnike, ki so na gibanja za pravice žensk vplivali 
v obeh državah. Zaključili smo, da so trije glavni dejavniki: 1. politični islam 2. režimski 
feminizem in 3. islam kot družbeno-politična ideologija. Podrobneje smo analizirali vse tri 
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dejavnike in njihov vpliv na prizadevanja gibanj za pravice žensk med procesom 
demokratizacije v obeh državah po arabski pomladi oz. med letoma 2011 in 2018.  
Islamski politični voditelji v Tuniziji so se z gibanji, ki so si prizadevala za vpis enakosti spolov 
v ustavo, srečali. Gibanja so uspela uveljaviti svoje zahteve in se pri tem uspešno borila proti 
ekstremističnemu diskurzu. Nasprotniki so svoja stališča utemeljevali na islamskih naukih in 
islamski identiteti države. Izvoljena je bila narodna ustavodajna skupščina, ki je svoje delo 
opravila transparentno. Gibanja za pravice žensk so zahtevala dodatne reforme in spremembo 
dednega prava. Islamska stranka Al Nahda Islamic je njihove zahteve po vnosu enakosti spolov 
v dedno pravo zavrnila. Dedno pravo temelji na šeriatu. Islamski učenjaki trdijo, da je šeriatsko 
pravo dokončno. V Jordaniji so gibanja za pravice žensk zahtevala vnos enakosti spolov v 
ustavo. Nasprotniki so navajali tudi utemeljitve iz šeriatskega prava. Gibanja za pravice žensk 
niso dosegla svojega cilja. Kralj je imenoval kraljevi odbor za oblikovanje sprememb ustave. 
Odbor je zahteve po vključitvi enakosti spolov zavrnil. Ljudstvo ni imelo možnosti sodelovati 
v procesu. Vladajoči režim je uvedel dodatne omejitve svobode govora. 
Režimski feminizem v Tuniziji je diskurz prizadevanj za enakost pri dedovanju prilagodil. 
Vendar so ga nekateri akademiki in politiki obtožili, da ustvarja selektivni feminizem in 
poskuša prikriti korupcijo (Belgith, 2018; Salman, 2017). Gibanja za pravice žensk v Tuniziji 
pridobivajo družbeno podporo in se upirajo proti izkoriščanju za politične namene z 
intersekcionalnim feminizmom. V Jordaniji je poldržavna organizacija nedavno politično 
izkoristila predstavnike civilnih gibanj za enakost v zakonu o državljanstvu. Analizirali smo 
premik od začetnih razprav o enakosti v zakonu o državljanstvu do diskurza o zagotavljanju 
pravic tujim možem in otrokom jordanskih žensk. Vendar pa je to vprašanje še aktualno in za 
kakršne koli zaključke so potrebne nadaljnje raziskave. Konvencija o odpravi vseh oblik 
diskriminacije žensk se je zdela možna rešitev pri spreminjanju spolno diskriminatorne 
zakonodaje. Vendar pa v obeh državah nekatere politične in družbene skupine nasprotujejo 
mednarodnim sporazumom in konvencijam o pravicah žensk. To je morebiti posledica post-
kolonializma. To vprašanje in možnost, da bi mednarodne sporazume nadomestili z 
regionalnim arabskim, bi bilo treba podrobneje raziskati. 
Gibanja za pravice žensk v Tuniziji in Jordaniji so bila uspešna v boju proti zakonodaji, ki 
posiljevalcem omogoča, da se s poroko z žrtvijo izognejo kazni. To ne pomeni, da se ta praksa 
ne več uporablja. Družbene norme krivdo za spolne napade pripisujejo ženski. Glede na okvir 
determinant (Nilsen, 2015) ženske zato zaradi strahu pred sramoto posilstev ne prijavljajo. V 
nekaterih primerih se ženske poročijo s svojimi posiljevalci, da bi tako zaščitile čast svoje 
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družine. Ugotavljamo, da te družbene norme izhajajo iz islamskih naukov. Ti skromnost in 
čistost žensk predstavljajo kot orodje za zaščito pred spolnimi napadi in zločini.  
Zaključimo lahko, da politični islam ni združljiv s politikami enakosti spolov. Gibanja za 
pravice žensk potrebujejo za sekularizacijo ustave in oblikovanja javnih politik radikalen 
pristop. V Tuniziji so gibanja za pravice žensk uspela doseči del svojih zahtev, ker je bil proces 
demokratizacije radikalen in ga je vodila leva stranka. To je skladno z zaključki portugalske 
raziskovalke Melo (Melo, 2016). V Jordaniji je šeriatsko pravo bolj vključeno v zakon o 
osebnem status. Zato gibanja za pravice žensk niso imela možnosti pri boju z islamskim 
diskurzom. Poleg tega niso imela dostopa do kanalov za javno sodelovanje. Gibanja za pravice 
žensk v Tuniziji morajo z intersekcionalnim feminizmom pridobiti podporo več različnih 
družbenih skupin in preprečiti, da ne bi postala politično orodje. 
Ne strinjamo se z akademiki, ki trdijo, da je islam združljiv s pravicami žensk (Rajie, 2012, 
str.51–65; Youssef 2016; Abu Fares, 2015). Zaključili smo, da islam ni združljiv z gibanji za 
enakost spolov. Morda je združljiv z omejenimi pravicami žensk, kar pa ni enakost spolov. Da 
bi lahko opredelili islamske diskurze, ki podpirajo sekularizacijo, bi bile potrebne nadaljnje 
raziskave.  
Prav tako oporekamo priporočilom dr. El Masri, da bi se morale feministke ekstremnemu 
islamskemu diskurzu upirati s citiranjem verzov iz Korana (El Masri, 2015). Strinjamo se z 
zaključki profesorja Mojad iz Irana, da utemeljevanje pravic žensk na islamu krepi patriarhalni 
sistem, proti kateremu se ni mogoče boriti (Mojab, 2001). Zato menimo, da bi bil islam lahko 
združljiv z gibanji za pravice žensk le v primeru, da bi se iz družbeno-politične ideologije 
spremenil v stvar osebne vere. Pri tem v nadaljnji razmislek odpiramo vprašanje: Ali je mogoče 
vzpostaviti most med islamskim diskurzom in sekularnostjo, ki podpira gibanja za pravice 
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Interviews at the Euro-Arab youth forum  
Five interviews in person, conducted at the Euro-Arab youth forum in Monastir, Tunisia, 9–15 
May 2018, and during the Intercultural Artistic Expression in Fragile Areas forum in 
Sousse, Tunisia, 8–10 September, 2017. The interviews were conducted in English and 
Arabic languages. The interviews were recorded and available by the author. They were 
recorded in the MP3 format.  
The interviewees are youth workers and social activists who participated in the forum. 
The general questions are:  
1. What is your opinion on the mobilization of women’s rights movements after the Arab 
Spring?  
2. What is your opinion on the current movement for equal inheritance law? 
3. What is political Islam and how it interacts with women’s rights movements?  
4. What do you think about Essebsi call for equal inheritance and how it interacts with 
Women’s rights movements?  
5. What are the challenges and the demands of Tunisian women after the Arab Spring? 
6. What kind of recommendations you would give for women’s rights movements?  
Contributors listed alphabetically  
• Ms. Fatma Jegham, political and social activist. Defines herself as feminist to the core 
• Mr. Mouldi el Tajouri, teacher and youth worker, working with alternative media and youth 
associations. 
• Mr. Qais ben Faraj, an activist at the youth forum, which has the support of the ministry of 
youth and sport 
• Ms. Rihab Abed al Maqsod, an executive director of the association Adventures for 
development, to integrate different social groups in the society through sports with special 
focus on women 








Skype interview with a social worker from Jordan.  
Interview with a social worker, working in rural areas in Jordan, held on 3 June 2018. The 
social worker runs workshops and seminars to spread awareness and combat domestic 
violence. 
The questions: 
• What are the causes of gender-based violence?  
• After the abolishment of marry-your-rapist law, will this phenomenon be also abolished 
from practice?  
• What are the crimes of honour and what is its causes?  
 
 
